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JEOPARDY AND MISTRIALS

The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." For the defendant who
declines to plead guilty and exercises the right to stand trial, the
double jeopardy provision thus promises that the ordeal will not
have to be repeated, or more accurately, that it may not have
to be repeated, for a defendant may indeed be subject to reprosecution when any of a number of exceptions is found applicable.
Of these exceptions, one of the most important, and most
troublesome, is the rule that a trial may be terminated prior to
verdict and the defendant subjected to retrial if, in the durable
language of United States v. Perez, the mistrial was prompted by
"manifest necessity."' In the more than 150 years since formulation of the Perez test, the course of adjudication has provided
little clarification of its meaning. Not long ago, the Supreme
Court began a process of narrowing the situations in which a
defendant could be retried after mistrial. 2 More recently, however, Illinois v. Somerville3 apparently reversed this trend and
signaled a return to the uncertainties of the general "manifest
necessity" formulation. As a result, limitations upon reprosecution generally have been relaxed; at the same time, mistrials once
again have become a potentially dangerous trap for the prosecution, with defendants on occasion winning immunity from
punishment because a trial judge is held to have improperly
applied the amorphous standard. Unsatisfactory as this situation
is, the complexity of the competing interests and the infinite
variety of circumstances in which they arise have continued to
impede formulation of a standard whose application can be at
once satisfying and predictable.
In this Article, I examine the sources of difficulty underlying the Perez test. I then suggest an approach through which
some of these difficulties can be avoided and the propriety of
retrial more meaningfully assessed. Some familiarity with the
doctrinal maze that is double jeopardy law generally seems requisite to appreciating the more specific subtleties of "manifest
necessity," so part I of the Article provides a preliminary tour
d'horizon. Part II reviews the evolution of the "manifest necessity"
' 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
2 See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); Downum v. United States, 372
U.S. 734 (1963).
3 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
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test from its beginnings in Perez through the recent struggles of
lower courts applying the Somerville version of it. Finally, part III
examines the interests affected by mistrial in situations that have
proved persistently troublesome and on this basis suggests a
framework for the resolution of mistrial problems.
The proposal builds upon my conclusion that the relatively
flexible approach implicit in Somerville provides the appropriate
standard for assessing the constitutionality of retrial in a wide
range of situations. I seek to identify these situations by using
guidelines keyed to the stage of trial at which the mistrial problem arises, and then specify the content of the flexible standard
of "sound judicial administration" that should be applied in
these situations. This flexible standard, however, will not adequately protect against the dangers of reprosecution in certain
other situations. I therefore offer guidelines for identifying
these other situations and specify the elements of the more restrictive "strict necessity" standard that should be applied when
the propriety of retrial in these situations must be determined.
My proposal will not provide an automatic answer to every
mistrial question that may arise. But it should permit resolution
of these questions with considerably greater predictability, with
due recognition for society's interest in an adequate opportunity
to convict the guilty, and, above all, with assurance that the erosion of protection for the accused begun in Somerville will not
proceed into areas in which stringent double jeopardy safeguards remain necessary.
I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN A NUTSHELL
The principle that a defendant may not be tried twice for
the same offense has been described, probably without exaggeration, as "one of the oldest ideas found in western civilization,"' 4
with roots traceable to early Greek, Roman, and canon law. 5
Blackstone recognized it as a "universal maxim of the common
law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his
life, more than once for the same offence."' 6 The protection originally afforded by this "universal maxim," however, was narBartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
I at 151-55 (Black, J., dissenting); United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 870-71
Id.
(2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.), aff'd, 420 U.S. 358 (1975). The double jeopardy principle
remained a creature of the peculiarities of judicial procedure in these legal systems, and
it does not appear to have assumed anything resembling its modern form until about
the fifteenth century. See J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 1-16 (1969).
6 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335.
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rowly circumscribed. Neither conviction nor acquittal barred
further proceedings if the verdict was rendered upon a faulty
indictment or by a court technically lacking jurisdiction, because
7
it was said that the defendant never had been in 'jeopardy."1
The common law pleas of former jeopardy were also unavailable
when proceedings were terminated prior to judgment, because
jeopardy was not deemed to "attach" until the verdict was rendered and duly recorded. 8 And the maxim applied only when
the defendant's life was in jeopardy; multiple prosecution for
noncapital felonies or misdemeanors was not restricted. 9
American jurisdictions began to expand the scope of the
common law doctrine as early as the colonial period.' 0 Double
jeopardy protection in the Colonies nevertheless remained narrow and technical, its application deeply dependent on the formalities of criminal pleading. When the framers of the fifth
amendment incorporated the "universal maxim" into the Bill of
Rights, their debates provided little indication of the intended
scope of double jeopardy protection. 1 ' Consequently, the courts
7 The leading decision concerning faulty indictments was Vaux's Case, 76 Eng.
Rep. 992 (K.B. 1591). See generally M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 74-75 (1969). For a
thorough treatment of the jurisdiction requirement, see id. 77-86.
"See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335-38. The defendant's protection was
limited further by the fact that the judge, before recording a verdict, could ask the jury
to reconsider it. As long as only one verdict was recorded, a verdict of acquittal could
thus be changed to one of conviction without imposing double jeopardy. See J.
ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 598 (36th ed. 1966).
Blackstone notes that a jury could not be discharged prior to verdict "unless in cases of
evident necessity," 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *360, but the defendant could not
prevail on a plea of former jeopardy after an improper discharge of the jury by the
trial judge. Winsor v. The Queen, L.R. 1 Q.B. 289 (1866); see M. FRIEDLAND, supra note
7, at 21-25.
9
See 4 W. BLACESTONE, COMMENTARIES *335-36. In England, double jeopardy protection now extends to noncapital cases, but the old limitations upon double jeopardy
protection otherwise appear to have survived. The first judgment must be rendered by
a court that has jurisdiction to try the offense. J. ARCHBOLD, supra note 8, at §§ 438,
451; C. HAMPTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 157 (1973). But see M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 7, at 77-80. Similarly, the rule that conviction or acquittal upon a
faulty indictment affords no protection apparently remains good law, J. ARCHBOLD,
supra note 8, at § 442, as does the rule that precludes remedies for improper discharge
of the jury before verdict, Regina v. Elia, [1968] 2 All E.R. 587 (C.A.); J. ARCHBOLD,
supra note 8, at § 605; see M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 7, at 21-25.
10 The doctrine was extended, for example, to all offenses, capital or otherwise, by
the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641. J. SIGLER, supra note 5, at 21-22. See generally G. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 129-30, 198-99 (1960).
As recently as 1964, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held Pennsylvania's
constitutional prohibition against putting any person "twice in jeopardy of life or limb"
inapplicable in a prosecution for the noncapital offense of second-degree murder. Commonwealth v. Baker, 413 Pa. 105, 196 A.2d 382 (1964).
1See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 201-02 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); J. SIGLER, supra note 5, at 27-34.
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have been left to interpret the double jeopardy clause12 in light of
their own understanding of its underlying purposes.
This process of judicial interpretation has resulted in a considerable expansion of double jeopardy protection. For example,
despite the "life or limb" language of the fifth amendment, double jeopardy protection extends to all crimes, capital or
otherwise. 1 3 Moreover, protection begins not when the verdict is
rendered, but as soon as the jury is sworn or, in a nonjury trial,
when the judge begins to hear evidence. 1 4 As a result, the double
jeopardy clause now serves a variety of important functions. Reflecting notions of res judicata, the clause ensures the finality of
a judgment of acquittal and protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. But the clause also provides protections unrelated to res judicata; once jeopardy "attaches" at the
beginning of the trial, reprosecution may be barred even though
no adjudication results from the first proceeding. The doctrine
thus provides more meaningful protection against the danger of
governmental harassment and the burden of repeated trials
than was afforded by the requirement of a final verdict.
Despite this expansion, the guarantees of the double jeopardy clause, as currently interpreted by American courts, are by
no means absolute. Remnants of early restrictions on the principle remain, and a host of competing interests has prompted
the creation of new limitations. Among the most important of
these limitations-and the subject of this Article-is the Perez
rule permitting reprosecution after a mistrial declared prior to
verdict for reasons of "manifest necessity." This rule will be better understood, however, after a brief survey of the various possibilities for retrial that remain even after a final judgment.
A final judgment of acquittal supposedly operates as a definitive discharge with respect to the accusations at issue. The
word "acquittal," however, is a special term of art. A jury verdict of not guilty always operates to discharge the defendant, 15
as does any judgment, no matter how improper, that purports to be an "acquittal" and is entered by the judge during
See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) (Black, J.).
"3 Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519
(1975) (double jeopardy principles held to bar adult prosecution after a juvenile court
prosecution on the same charge).
14 Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); Newman v. United States, 410
F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Compare Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975), with
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
15 United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
12
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the trial and before verdict. In these situations, the government
may not appeal, and reprosecution is not pernissible. 16 On the
other hand, if the judge sets aside a jury verdict of guilty and
dismisses the charges, the ruling is appealable on the theory
that a reversal will not require a retrial, because a judgment of
conviction may be entered on the jury's original verdict.' 7 A
trial judge's decision dismissing charges may also be appealed if
the ruling, whether or not entered after an evidentiary hearing,
occurred before the beginning of the trial on the merits.' 8 Although a successful government appeal will expose the defendant to new proceedings, the theory is that there is no
reprosecution because jeopardy had yet to attach in the first
trial.
Even the required kind of "acquittal," however, does not
wholly guarantee the defendant's freedom from further prosecution. The first verdict will not bar further prosecution if the
verdict was rendered by a court that lacked jurisdiction.' 9 Acquittal by a state court will not provide immunity against federal prosecution on the same charges,2 0 and, perhaps more
surprisingly, the reverse is also true.2 ' Moreover, an acquittal
22
will bar subsequent prosecution only for the same offense.
This rule is a source of continuing controversy, and forceful
arguments have been made that an "offense" for this purpose
1 See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962).

"7 United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975). Similarly, a court of appeals' decision remanding the case for entry of a judgment of acquittal does not definitively discharge the defendant; the decision may be reversed on either a petition for rehearing
or a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Forman v. United States, 361 U.S.
416 (1960).
11 Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
19Woodring v. United States, 337 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
933 (1965); State v. Price, 15 N.C. App. 599, 190 S.E.2d 403, appeal dinnissed, 281 N.C.
762, 191 S.E.2d 364 (1972). Jurisdictional defects, however, will not defeat the double
jeopardy claim if they are deemed to render the judgment "voidable" rather than
"void." State ex rel. Johnson v. Thomson, 76 N.D. 125, 34 N.W.2d 80 (1948); see United
States v. Sabella, 272 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1959).
20 See United States v. Barnhart, 22 F. 285 (C.C.D. Ore. 1884); United States v.
Sutton, 245 F. Supp. 357 (D. Md. 1965), aff'd, 363 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1014 (1967).
21 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). For suggestions that the rationale of
Bartkus may have been vitiated by recent decisions, see Schaefer, Unresolved Issues in the
Law of Double Jeopardy: Waller and Ashe, 58 CAL. L. REv. 391, 401-02 (1970). See also
Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970), holding that a state's division of jurisdiction
between state and"local courts does not permit retrial in one system after trial in the
other system.
For a discussion of the Justice Department's policy concerning federal prosecution
following state prosecution on the same charges, see note 26 infra.
22 See generally 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.418[2] (2d ed. 1974).
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should include all crimes arising out of the same transaction or
event.2 3 The prevailing view, however, has been that prosecutors need the flexibility to present technically different
charges in different trials. As a result, two offenses are not considered the same for double jeopardy purposes unless they involve precisely the same elements, or, as some courts put it,
24
unless precisely the same evidence will suffice to prove both.
Similar possibilities for further proceedings await a defendant found guilty at the initial trial. In principle, conviction and
sentencing should bar additional punishment for the same
offense. 25 But here again the "two sovereigns" concept comes
into play, permitting separate state and federal prosecutions for
the same crime. 26 Because the relevant "offense" is again narrowly defined, cumulative punishment is permissible for each
27
technically separate crime committed in a single escapade.
Furthermore, if the defendant succeeds in upsetting his or hier
conviction on appeal, retrial is permitted under United States v.
Ball.2 8 Judicial efforts to account for the Ball doctrine in terms
21 See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448-60 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
24 Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299 (1932). Indeed, the Court has allowed prosecutions for two offenses, even
when the evidentiary facts necessary to prove each are precisely the same, if statutory
presumptions permit different ultimate facts to be found from each. Harris v. United
States, 359 U.S. 19 (1959). Acquittal on one charge will foreclose prosecution for a
different offense if that offense requires proof of a fact necessarily resolved in the
defendant's favor in the first case, Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), but the issues
in a criminal case are rarely sufficiently simple to permit invocation of this principle
after a general verdict of acquittal.
25 Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
26Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959); see note 21 supra & accompanying text.
Current United States Department of Justice policy forbids federal prosecution following state prosecution on the same charges, except upon the explicit approval of the
appropriate Assistant Attorney General. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529,
530-31 (1960). See also Schwartz, Federal CriminalJurisdictionand Prosecutors'Discretion, 13
L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 65, 73 (1948). In several recent cases, however, the Justice Department has violated this policy. When the error is acknowledged at higher eschelons
of the Department, the defendant may belatedly obtain dismissal of the federal charges,
see, e.g., Watts v. United States, 422 U.S. 1032 (1975), but if the Department's change of
position comes too late, the court may refuse to dismiss the charges even upon the joint
motion of the prosecution and defense, see, e.g., In re Washington, 531 F.2d 1297 (5th
Cir. 1976).
2 Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299 (1932).
28163 U.S. 662, 671-72 (1896). This result differs from the common law rule prohibiting retrial after reversal of a conviction, a rule that survives in English law to
this day. Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 2(2)-(3); see M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 7, at
221-28. The force of this stringent rule has been mitigated only by the very limited
qualification that the quashed conviction will not be given the collateral estoppel effect
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of "waiver" of the defendant's immunity from retrial or in terms
of a single "continuing jeopardy" generally are conceded to be
conceptually sterile, and the only real justification for the doctrine is the practical importance of preventing every trial defect from conferring immunity upon the accused.2 9 Nevertheless, the Ball doctrine does substantially reduce the protection
against successive prosecutions by permitting a second trial following governmental error or misconduct in the first, provided
that the first trial had ended in a conviction. And the doctrine
has been extended to permit retrial when the underlying error
is the trial judge's failure to direct a verdict of acquittal, an action
that would have barred government appeal or reprosecution if
properly taken. 30

Double jeopardy doctrine thus remains riddled with loopholes of varying conceptual coherence and uneven pragmatic
justification. But as imperfect as the defendant's protection is in
cases of "acquittal" or "conviction," double jeopardy protection is
subject to even greater erosion in the absence of meaningful
restrictions upon the government's power to terminate a trial
before judgment and begin anew. The next section focuses upon
the content of these important restrictions.
II.

RETRIAL AFTER MISTRIAL: THE "MANIFEST
NECESSITY" DOCTRINE

Once jeopardy has attached in a criminal trial, circumstances
often will suggest that the proceedings should be terminated
prior to a formal verdict of guilt or acquittal. In such situations,
the judge need not, at least in theory, decide whether a subsequent trial on the same charges would be permissible; the only
question before the court is whether the first trial should be
discontinued. Nevertheless, the judge's obligation to select
of a full-fledged acquittal. Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1964] A.C.
1254, 48 Crim. App. 183.
29 United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964). See also Breed v. Jones, 421
U.S. 519, 534-35 (1975).
11 Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950). If, however, the defendant moves
only for a judgment of acquittal and does not file an alternative motion for a new trial,
then reprosecution is impermissible. United States v. Musquiz, 445 F.2d 963 (5th Cir.
1971); see Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955) (Douglas, J., concurring); United
States v. Bass, 490 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1974). To this extent, the discredited "waiver"
concept still plays a significant role in determining the scope of the Ball doctrine.
If the defendant is convicted upon retrial, the imposition of a sentence more severe
than that imposed after the original conviction does not violate the double jeopardy
clause, although such an increased sentence may, under some circumstances, constitute
a denial of due process. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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among different forms of termination orders has meant that in
practice both questions are resolved, at least in the first instance,
at the initial trial.
If the trial judge suspends the proceedings and either dismisses the indictment with prejudice, directs a verdict of acquittal, or enters a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial, the ruling
operates to foreclose subsequent prosecution on the charges involved because appellate review of these rulings is barred by the
double jeopardy clause. 3 1 If instead, the trial judge terminates
the proceedings by declaring a mistrial, the order is taken to
reflect a judgment that retrial on the same charges should be
permitted. Although a double jeopardy claim will not arise until
subsequent proceedings actually begin, 32 the claim nonetheless
constitutes an attack on the propriety of the original mistrial
declaration. This section examines judicial efforts to develop
standards for resolving this kind of claim in cases in which the
defendant opposed the mistrial declaration from the outset or
was afforded no opportunity to question it. The possibilities for
asserting a double jeopardy claim when the defense has affirmatively sought the mistrial order, and thus arguably waived its
protection against retrial, will be considered after the scope of
33
this protection has been delineated.
A.

Perez and the Early Cases

The Supreme Court first considered the permissibility of
reprosecution after mistrial in 1824 in United States v. Perez.34
The defendant had been tried on a capital charge. When the
jurors were unable to agree, they were discharged, and the defendant was held for retrial. The Court ruled that discharge of
the "hung" jury did not bar further proceedings:
31 See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
32 Normally the double jeopardy claim must be raised by the defendant prior to
retrial. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b). If the claim is denied by the trial judge, the
defendant may have to await conviction in the second trial before obtaining appellate
review of the validity of the proceedings. A growing body of cases, however, recognizes
that such relief is insufficient, and permits appellate review of the double jeopardy issue
before trial, either by interlocutory appeal, see, e.g., United States v. Barket, 530 F.2d
181 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1976); United States v.
Beckerman, 516 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1975), or by writ of habeas corpus, see, e.g., United
States ex rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1975); United
States ex rel. Russo v. Superior Court, 483 F.2d 7 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023
(1973).
33 See text accompanying notes 309-33 infra.
3' 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
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We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has
invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in
their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the
ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.
They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject;
and it is impossible to define all the circumstances,
which would render it proper to interfere. To be sure,
the power ought to be used with the greatest caution,
under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and, in capital cases especially, Courts
should be extremely careful how they interfere with any
of the chances of life, in favour of the prisoner. But,
after all, they have the right to order the discharge; and
the security which the public have for the faithful,
sound, and conscientious exercise of this discretion,
rests, in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of
35
the Judges, under their oaths of office.
The language of "manifest necessity" and the warning that
the power to declare mistrials "ought to be used with the greatest
caution, under urgent circumstances" suggested that mistrial decisions might be subjected to the closest scrutiny. But Supreme
Court decisions soon dispelled this view. In subsequent cases, the
language of "caution" and "necessity" drew far less attention
than Perez's repeated references to "discretion," and Perez usually
was cited as a case narrowly limiting the power of appellate
courts to question a trial judge's mistrial order. In fact, until the
1960's no Supreme Court decision ever held the grant of a mistrial to be improper under Perez.3 6
This result in part reflected the Court's general reluctance
to impose specific rules of procedure in state criminal cases.
Because the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment had
been held inapplicable to the states, 37 retrial following mistrial in
35

Id. at 580.
'6 For cases upholding the grant of mistrial, see Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684
(1949) (military necessity); Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916) (defect in plea to
the indictment); Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909) (hung jury); Dreyer v. Illinois,
187 U.S. 71 (1902) (hung jury); Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (disqualification of juror); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892) (hung jury); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (disqualification ofjuror). Many lower court
decisions, however, did find mistrial declarations improper in certain circumstances. See
notes 57-60 infra & accompanying text.
" Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 125:449

a state court could be barred only under the less demanding
strictures of fourteenth amendment due process.
This view led to Supreme Court approval of mistrials in
situations very far from the urgent and necessary circumstances
contemplated by Perez. Perhaps the most egregious of these decisions was Brock v. North Carolina.A There the state prosecutor
had completed the bulk of his case when two of his corroborating witnesses refused to testify, claiming the privilege
against self incrimination. The trial judge declared a mistrial so
that, after pending charges against the two witnesses were resolved, the prosecutor could have the benefit of their testimony. The Supreme Court found no constitutional bar to retrial, stressing that "[j]ustice to either or both parties may indicate to the wise discretion of the trial judge that he declare a
mistrial and require the defendant to stand trial before another
39
jury.
This relatively permissive attitude toward retrials, however,
was not confined to cases coming from the state courts. In Gori
v. United States, 40 the federal trial judge had abruptly declared a
mistrial during the government's direct examination of its fourth
witness. Although the reasons for his action were never made
entirely clear, the trial judge apparently believed that the
prosecutor's line of questioning would eventually touch on other
crimes committed by the defendant. The judge, in his desire to
forestall prejudice to the accused, ordered the mistrial before the
prosecutor had even asked an offending question, and before
any objection had been raised by the defense.
The Supreme Court again concluded that retrial was not
barred by the double jeopardy clause. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
writing for the majority, accepted the lower court's finding that
the trial judge
had displayed "overzealousness" and had acted
"too hastily, '' 4 1 but declined to examine the propriety of the mistrial ruling on its merits. The Court stressed that it was not able
to render an independent judgment upon events occurring in
the heat of trial, and although it quoted the "manifest necessity"
language of Perez, the Court refused to "scrutinize with sharp
surveillance the exercise of [a trial judge's] discretion. "42 The
38344 U.S. 424 (1953).
39
Id.at 427.
40367 U.S. 364 (1961).
41Id. at 366.
42

d. at 368.
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fact that the judge's action was "neither apparently justified nor
clearly erroneous '4 3 was therefore treated by the Court as sufficient reason not to overturn the mistrial order at least when it
apparently had been entered solely out of solicitude for the defendant.
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by three other members of the
Court, dissented. For him, the starting point was not the Perez
principle of discretion, but instead the Perez principle that once
jeopardy attaches, a subsequent prosecution should be allowed
only in the most exceptional circumstances. Arguing that the
double jeopardy clause was "designed to help equalize the position of government and the individual," 4 4 the Douglas dissent
concluded that the risk of precipitous or improper action by the
trial judge should rest on the government rather than on the
defendant.
With Gori, the defendant's protection against reprosecution
after mistrial had disintegrated almost to the vanishing point.
The courts considered the proposition settled that a mistrial followed by retrial was the proper course in the event of a hung
jury45 or "a breakdown in judicial machinery. '46 The latter included not only military exigency, 47 but also illness of the
defendant, 4 8 the judge,4 9 or a juror,5 0 and in some instances
even illness in the family of the judge 51 or a juror. 52 The discovery of juror bias, whether in favor of the prosecution or the
defense, likewise created a "necessity" for mistrial, 53 as did the
existence of a procedural defect in the institution of the prosecution, albeit through the fault of the government. 54 To treat such
difficulties as instances of "breakdown" involved considerable
hyperbole because continuances, replacement of jurors, or vari43

Id. at 367.
44Id. at 372 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
" See, e.g., Gilmore v. United States, 264 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
994 (1959).
4'Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 372 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
47
See, e.g., Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
48See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 140 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
41See, e.g., Freeman v. United States, 237 F. 815 (2d Cir. 1916).
"See, e.g., United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 584
(1941).
" See, e.g., Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 126 N.W. 737 (1910).
52
See, e.g., Stocks v. State, 91 Ga. 831, 18 S.E. 847 (1893).
" See, e.g., United States v. Cimino, 224 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1955); United States v.
McCunn,
36 F.2d 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
54
See, e.g., Simpson v. United States, 229 F. 940 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 241 U.S. 668
(1916).
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ous other techniques short of mistrial were often available to
cure them. Nevertheless, the abundant decisions were virtually
unanimous in holding that retrial in such situations did not sub55
ject the defendant to double jeopardy.
The defendant's position was not very much better when
difficulties not involving structural "breakdown" arose. Reviewing courts generally regarded problems of trial practice, such as
the handling of witnesses and their testimony, as matters peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge. Gori made it virtually impossible to challenge this discretion if the mistrial decision
appeared to benefit the defendant, and even if the mistrial
clearly benefited the prosecution, the reviewing court often deferred to the trial judge. Indeed, courts frequently upheld mis56
trials prompted solely by the absence of prosecution witnesses.
This approach toward mistrials greatly restricted a
defendant's ability to invoke the double jeopardy clause successfully after a mistrial declaration. Although the defendant presumably could prevail by establishing deliberate harassment by
the prosecution or an effort by the trial judge to help the government because its case had been going badly, 5 7 such situations,
whatever their frequency, seldom were proved in court. A double jeopardy claim also might prevail if a mistrial resulted from
unpreparedness on the part of the prosecution, although the
case law was split on this issue. 58 Finally, a mistrial based on a
structural defect could be attacked by showing that, in fact, no
such defect existed. This possibility, however, often produced
rather anomalous results. For example, an apparent defect in an
indictment would justify subjecting the defendant to mistrial and
reprosecution provided that the government truly had bungled
its job. 5 9 But an appellate ruling that the indictment had been
properly drawn would render the mistrial ruling erroneous and
60
immunize the defendant from reprosecution.
SS

See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 79-87

(1935); Annot., 6 L. Ed. 2d 1510 (1961).
6See, e.g.,

United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No.

14,858) (Story, J.); State v. Collins, 115 N.C. 716, 20 S.E. 452 (1894).

57 Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 369 (1961) (dictum).
58 Compare Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931), with cases cited
note 56 supra.
9 See, e.g., Simpson v. United States, 229 F. 940 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 241 U.S. 668
(1916).
6
See, e.g., Loyd v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. 76, 116 P. 959 (1911); cf. People v. Laws,
29 111. 2d 221, 193 N.E.2d 806 (1963) (trial judge erroneously thought failure to take
the defendant's plea was a fatal defect); Gillespie v. State, 168 Ind. 298, 80 N.E. 829
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These early cases thus evidenced a relatively technical approach to double jeopardy claims. Little attention was focused on
the underlying constitutional policy of protecting a defendant
from deliberate harassment and the strain of repeated trials.
This policy was viewed as far less important than the need for
flexibility and deference to the decision rendered on the spot by
the trial judge.
B.

The Modern Era: Downum,
Jorn, and Somerville

Less than two years after its decision in Gori, the Supreme
Court radically transformed the jurisprudence of mistrials in
Downum v. United States.6 1 The case involved a prosecution on six
counts of mail theft and forgery. After the jury was selected and
sworn, but before testimony began, the prosecutor asked that the
jury be discharged because his key witness for two of the counts
was not present. This motion was granted over the defendant's
objection, and two days later the case was called again, a second
jury was impaneled, and the defendant was tried and convicted
on all counts.
On these facts, the Court held that the defendant had been
subjected to double jeopardy and reversed the convictions. Mr.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, 6 2 recognized some discretion to discharge a jury before a verdict, but stressed, as he
had in the Gori dissent, that this discretion should be exercised
"only in very extraordinary and striking circumstances. '6 3 While
refusing to hold that absence of witnesses could never justify a
mistrial, the Court noted that in the case before it the witness'
unavailability had been known before the jury was impaneled.
The prosecutor therefore was responsible for the difficulty and
took his chances by proceeding. In its closing passage, the Court
made plain the guiding premise of its approach: "We resolve any
doubt 'in favor of the liberty of the citizen, rather than exercise
what would be an unlimited, uncertain, and arbitrary judicial
discretion.' "64
(1907) (trial judge erroneously found a juror to be related to one of the defendants).
61 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
62 Mr. Justice Douglas wrote for a majority of five, consisting of the Gori dissenters
and Mr. Justice Goldberg, who had replaced Mr. Justice Frankfurter on the Court.
63 372 U.S. at 736 (quoting United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622, 623 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1815)).
64
1d. at 738 (quoting United States ex rel. Rush v. Watson, 28 F. Cas. 499, 501
(S.D.N.Y. 1868)).
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Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the four dissenters, noted
both the apparent good faith and diligence of the prosecutor,6 5
and the lack of any discernible prejudice to the defendant. 66 More
importantly, he stressed that the trial judge handled the problem in a reasonable manner. While a mistrial might have been
avoided by a continuance or by severance of the charges, the
former approach could have disrupted the court's calendar and
the latter might have seriously hampered presentation of the
government's case. Under these circumstances, the dissenters
regarded the mistrial solution as a valid exercise of discretion.
The Court easily might have reconciled the result in
Downum with its earlier decision in Gori. The Downum mistrial,
unlike the mistrial in Gori, certainly was not intended to help the
accused. The general rule of deference to trial court decisions,
moreover, often had been held inapplicable to mistrials ordered
because of the absence of prosecution witnesses. 6 And in Gori,
where the impact of testimony was at issue, the need for deference to the trial judge was far greater than in Downum, where
assessment of the relevant facts required no familiarity with "the
68
heated atmosphere of trial.
The Downum Court, however, chose not to distinguish Gori
on any of these grounds. Rather, it emphasized the policy of
resolving all doubts in the defendant's favor to spare him the
burden of successive prosecutions, and it sharply criticized the
exercise of "arbitrary judicial discretion." This approach suggested that more searching review would become the rule in a
broad range of mistrial situations. Moreover, the Court appeared
unconcerned with the availability of possible alternatives to mistrial, such as severance or continuance. 69 Its failure to discuss this
issue suggested that a variety of trial problems attributable to
governmental error might be held insufficient to justify mistrial,
even in the absence of any alternative solution.
65

Id. at 742 (Clark, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 743 (Clark, J., dissenting).
67 See text accompanying note 58 supra.
68 Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 366 (1961) (quoting the lower court opinion,
282 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1960)). See also Note, DoubleJeopardy: The ReprosecutionProblem,
77 HARV. L. REV. 1272, 1278-79 (1964).
" The Court mentioned that the missing witness was essential for only two of the
counts and that the prosecution might have proceeded on the remaining four. 372 U.S.
at 737. Yet the Court barred retrial even for the two counts on which it had been
impossible to proceed. Moreover, the Court nowhere suggested that its view was dependent on the feasibility of a continuance, a solution that the dissenters regarded as
impracticable under the circumstances. Id. at 742 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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In United States v. Jorn,70 the Court reaffirmed Downum and
perhaps even extended it. Jorn was prosecuted for willfully assisting in the preparation of fraudulent tax returns. After the
jury was sworn, the government called as a witness one of the
taxpayers whom the defendant had allegedly aided. The trial
judge believed that this witness, and several others similarly
situated, had not been adequately informed of their constitutional rights. Without considering alternative remedies, he dismissed the jury and declared a mistrial in order to give the
witnesses time to retain their own attorneys and to consult with
them. Prior to the second trial, the same judge upheld the
defendant's plea of former jeopardy, and the Supreme Court
affirmed.
Speaking for a plurality of four,7 1 Mr. Justice Harlan quoted
the relevant Perez language in full but found in it the "theme of a
'manifest necessity' standard of appellate review. ' 72 Gori was
treated as representing a possible "variation" under which review
might be less searching if the mistrial was declared for the
defendant's benefit. But Mr. Justice Harlan sharply criticized the
Gori opinion (in which he had joined) and explicitly rejected any
limitation on review based upon the intended beneficiary of
the mistrial, stressing that the double jeopardy clause protects the defendant from the strain and insecurity of retrial even
when oppressive government tactics are absent. Accordingly,
the plurality held that "independent of the threat of bad-faith
conduct by judge or prosecutor, the defendant has a significant interest in the decision whether or not to take the case from
the jury. ' 73 A trial judge abuses his or her discretion by ordering
a mistrial without a "scrupulous" search for alternative means to
deal with difficulties, whether or not attributable to the government. Because the trial judge had made no effort to explore the
possibility of a continuance to permit the witnesses to consult
with counsel, he had not exercised the "sound discretion" required by Perez.
70 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
"' Justices Black and Brennan took the view that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over the government's appeal because the trial judge's action operated as an
"acquittal" of Jorn. Because the majority reached the merits, they joined in the judgment of affirmance but not in the plurality opinion. Id. at 488 (Black & Brennan, JJ.,
concurring). See generally text accompanying notes 15-18 supra on the question of appeal
by the prosecution.
"
400 U.S. at 482.
73
Id.
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Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the three dissenters, found
the plurality opinion "flatly inconsistent" with Gori.14 Because
there was no indication of intent to harass and no suggestion of
prejudice to the defendant, he would have allowed reprosecution.
Because the two concurring Justices appeared to entertain
an even stricter conception of double jeopardy requirements
than did the plurality,7 5 a few courts made the hazardous assumption that Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion in effect reflected the
governing rule.7 6 If it did,Jorn further tightened the limitations
on retrial after mistrial. Both Downum and Jorn upheld double
jeopardy claims in the absence of actual or potential harassment
77
and in the absence of identifiable prejudice to the defendant.
But Downum involved a particularly unpardonable fault of the
prosecutor-unpreparedness. Jorn, on the other hand, concerned a trial problem for which only the judge was even arguably at fault and stated that whatever the source of the particular
problem, the trial judge faces the same obligation to search diligently for alternative solutions before declaring a mistrial.
Presumably, therefore, problems beyond the control of any of
the parties, such as illness or other "acts of God," also would
trigger this obligation. Jorn thus appeared to lay to rest the old
notion of deference to the trial judge and to replace it with
appellate review based on a test that offered some hope for
meaningful analysis and predictable results by focusing on actual
'necessity" in light of available alternatives.
Just two years afterJorn, the Court addressed the problem
again, but in considerably different terms. The jury in Illinois v.
Somerville7 8 had been impaneled and sworn, but before any evi74Id.

at 491 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See note 71 supra. The appearance was, of course, deceptive because the position
of Justices Black and Brennan on the question of government appeals would not compel a correspondingly strict attitude toward the distinct issue of the propriety of mistrial. 76
E.g., Clemensen v.Municipal Court, 18 Cal. App. 3d 492, 499, 96 Cal. Rptr. 126,
129-30 (1971); People v. Gardner, 37 Mich. App. 520, 525, 195 N.W.2d 62, 65 (1972).
Contra, Baker v. State, 15 Md. App. 73, 289 A.2d 348 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 969
(1973). See generally Note, Mistrial and Double Jeopardy, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 937, 945-46
n.56 (1974). For consideration of the problematical status of plurality opinions generally, see Davis & Reynolds,Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974
DUKE L.J. 59.
7 There was, for example, no showing that the jury selected in the first trial was
likely to be especially sympathetic to the defense, that testimony at the first trial was
surprisingly favorable to the accused, or that evidence became unavailable to the defense prior to the second trial.
78 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
7-
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dence was taken the prosecutor realized that the indictment was
fatally defective. Under Illinois law the defect could not be
waived; any conviction therefore could have been overturned by
the defendant on appeal or in a subsequent collateral proceeding. The trial court granted a mistrial so that the grand jury
could hand down a properly drawn indictment, and the defendant was then tried and convicted on the second indictment.
Because in 1969 the double jeopardy clause had been held
to be incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, 79 the validity
of this state mistrial decision was governed by fifth amendment
standards. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, dividing five to
four, rejected the defendant's double jeopardy claim. Mr. Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court drew from prior cases a general rule approving mistrials "if an impartial verdict cannot be
reached, or if a verdict of conviction could be reached but would
have to be reversed on appeal due to an obvious procedural
error in the trial. '80 Downum was distinguished as involving a
difficulty that "len[t] itself to prosecutorial manipulation" 8' and
Jon as involving "erratic" action by the trial judge in a situation
in which alternatives made mistrial unnecessary. In contrast, the
Court found in Somerville no demonstrable prejudice to the defendant and no possibility of manipulation by the government.
And in view of state procedures, which the Somerville Court declined to question, mistrial was seen as the only available remedy
short of the wasteful process of delaying retrial until after completion of the first trial, conviction, and reversal.
Mr. Justice White, speaking for three of the dissenters, considered the case controlled by Downum and Jorn, which had up,9 Benton

v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
so 410 U.S. at 464.
" Id. The Court also distinguished Downum as a case in which the mistrial "operated as a post-jeopardy continuance to allow the prosecution an opportunity to
strengthen its case." Id. at 469. The passage is a perplexing one. In one stroke the
Court passed up the opportunity to distinguish Downum as a case in which an alternative to mistrial (continuance) was readily available, lent its support to the view that
mistrial would have been improper in Downum even in the absence of alternatives, see
text accompanying note 69 supra, and plainly implied that in a case like Downum an
order granting a short continuance-in lieu of mistrial-might itself violate the double
jeopardy clause. Acceptance of the last of these propositions would represent a revolutionary extension of double jeopardy doctrine, because it has been considered settled that a trial judge may properly allow a midtrial continuance to enable the government to present additional witnesses or to prepare its rebuttal more fully, except when
prosecutorial neglect is inexcusable and the continuance represents an unreasonable
break in the continuity of the trial. See note 212 infra & accompanying text. It is difficult to believe that the Court in Somerville intended to upset this principle.
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held double jeopardy claims in the absence of any specific prejudice to the defendant and in the absence of harassment or
other governmental misconduct beyond mere oversight or mistake. State procedure made the mistrial "necessary" only because
of the government's failure to frame a proper indictment, an
error he found indistinguishable from the government's unpreparedness in Downum. In arguing that the defendant's interest in
having his trial completed by the first tribunal should take precedence in this situation, Mr. Justice White implied that he
agreed with the view, traceable to Downum, that mistrial should
be improper whenever difficulties result from error on the part
of the prosecution, even if no alternative means for curing
the error are available. A separate dissent by Mr. Justice Marshall explicitly accepted this position 82 but relied primarily on
the ostensibly narrower ground that alternatives were in fact
available here-the trial judge could have held that the indictment was amendable under state law, a view that might have
persuaded the state supreme court, or he could have proceeded
with the trial, a course that might have ended the matter with
an acquittal.8 3 Beyond this, Mr. Justice Marshall called for a
searching analysis of the importance of the state procedural rule
at issue; he found the state interest in protecting the jurisdiction
of the indicting grand jury far less substantial than the
defendant's right to have his trial completed by the first trier of
fact.
Somerville is, as the dissenting opinions indicate, exceedingly
difficult to reconcile with the combined holdings of Downum and
Jorn. Of the innumerable factors involved in each case, four
seem particularly significant: (1) the source of the difficulty
(prosecutorial error, act of God, and so on); (2) the associated
motivation (intentional harassment, potential harassment, or
evident good faith); (3) the indicated prejudice to the defendant
associated with retrial (loss of a tactical advantage gained in the
first trial or other harm apart from the fact of retrial itself); and
(4) the available alternatives to mistrial. In terms of these factors,
Jorn held both potential harassment and identifiable prejudice
unnecessary to a double jeopardy claim, at least when error is
attributable to the government and alternatives are available.
812410 U.S. at 483 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

sa Another alternative, not mentioned by Mr. Justice Marshall, was to abort the trial
but then to reimpanel the same jury to hear the case on the corrected indictment. See
note 270 infra.
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The defendant's claim in Somerville went beyond that in Jorn,
because, at least arguably, a workable alternative to mistrial was
not available. Downum, however, suggested that mistrial is improper, whether alternatives are available or not, as long as the
error originates with the prosecution. In this sense, Downum and
Jorn together required upholding the double jeopardy claim in
Somerville.
One way of reconciling the three cases is suggested by the
Somerville Court's treatment of Downum as a case in which the
potential for prosecutorial manipulation existed. Although the
Downum situation had not been so interpreted by the Court at
the time, viewing it in this way leads to the following pattern of
rules: mistrial is improper if a difficulty originates with the government and is subject to manipulation, even if no prejudice
results and no alternatives are available (Downum); mistrial is also
improper if a difficulty originates with the government and alternatives are available, even if no prejudice results and the difficulty is not subject to manipulation (Jon); mistrial is proper,
however, if a difficulty originates with the government but no
prejudice is shown, the difficulty is not subject to manipulation,
and no alternatives are available (Somerville). A double jeopardy
claim may, in short, succeed in the absence of demonstrable
prejudice, in the absence of available alternatives, or in the absence of a potential for manipulation, but not in the absence of
all three.
This analysis may reconcile the principal cases; it may even
suggest a plausible if somewhat mechanical means for reconciling the relevant competing interests. It does not, however, fully
capture the implications of the Somerville opinion. Consider first
the Court's treatment of the Downum facts. If the unavailability of the principal witness in Downum "would lend itself to
prosecutorial manipulation, ' 4 it is hard to see how the same is
not equally true of the deficiency of the indictment in Somerville.
In neither case was the difficulty likely to be injected deliberately
so that the prosecution would have an escape hatch if its case
should go badly. If anything, the difficulty in Downum was less
susceptible to prosecutorial manipulation: a prosecutor might
hope for conviction on a technically defective indictment, 85 but
84 Illinois

v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464 (1973).
11 As early as United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), the Court recognized that
a defendant brought to trial upon a fatally defective indictment is from a practical
standpoint very much in jeopardy, and that the legally insufficient conviction may
nevertheless send him to prison. Id. at 667-68.
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he or she scarcely could expect to convict without the witnesses
essential to prove the case. As a result, the Somerville opinion may
suggest that a significant possibility or even probability of actual
harassment may be necessary to invoke whatever remains of the
Downum rule.
The Somerville Court's treatment ofJorn poses similar problems. The description of the Somerville situation as one in which
there was essentially no alternative to mistrial suggests that the
Jorn requirement of a "scrupulous" search for alternatives survives intact. But other passages imply that the vice in Jorn was
the rejection of alternatives "in the absence of some important
countervailing interest. ' 86 Conceivably, an alternative need not
be pursued if it would involve any significant inconvenience. Still
other portions of the Rehnquist opinion can be read as dispensing with even this limited requirement, so long as the trial
'87
judge's performance is not regarded as "erratic.
Most troubling, however, is the Court's statement that a mistrial is proper "if an impartial verdict cannot be reached or if a
verdict of conviction could be reached but would have to be
reversed on appeal due to an obvious procedural error .
"88
Taken literally, this passage requires upholding a mistrial order
even if some other device could have cured the error-even if,
for example, state procedure permitted the cure of defective
indictments either by mistrial or by amendment. Given the
Court's treatment ofJorn, it is unfortunately not easy to dismiss
this reading of the passage as an unintended one.
Somerville, however, may not have limited double jeopardy
protection as severely as these facets of the opinion suggest.
Somerville reaffirmed the proposition that a trial judge's exercise
of discretion should be "scrutinized, ' 8 9 and specifically approved
the important implication ofJorn that "lack of demonstrable additional prejudice [other than retrial itself will not] preclude the
defendant's invocation of the double jeopardy bar in the absence
of some important countervailing interest .
-.
" In fact, the
Somerville Court passed up the opportunity to dismiss the Jon
plurality opinion as representing the views of only four Justices
and instead referred repeatedly to the Harlan analysis as that of
86 410 U.S. at 471.
87
Id. at 469.
88

d. at 464.
Id. at 462-63.
90
Id.at 471.
9
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"the Court."9 1 In this sense, Somerville actually strengthens the
authority of Jorn and requires careful evaluation of the
defendant's interest in having his or her case completed by the
first tribunal.
Considerable caution is necessary, therefore, in tracing the
extent to which Somerville has relaxed the barriers to reprosecution after mistrial. The case undoubtedly calls for a significant
shift in emphasis in the analysis of mistrial decisions. The Court's
reading of Downum andJorn suggests that, in cases not involving
demonstrable prejudice to the defendant, retrial will be permitted unless there is either a probability of harassment or a failure
to consider readily available alternatives. Even when mistrial
raises a specific problem for the defense, retrial conceivably
might be permitted if the alternatives to mistrial involve serious
inconvenience found to outweigh the potential for prejudice to
the defendant. Somerville thus appears to discard the sharply
focused analysis of alternatives required by Jorn in favor of an
open-ended balancing of all the facts. And, more importantly,
underlying this change in method may be a change in the conception of the double jeopardy clause itself, with its function in
the mistrial context now seen almost exclusively as one of protecting the defendant from governmental harassment, and not,
as so emphatically stated by theJorn plurality, safeguarding the
defendant from the strain and insecurity that result from retrials
"independent of the threat of bad-faith conduct by judge or
'92
prosecutor.
C. The Remaining Questions
The changing tides that have marked the jurisprudence of
mistrials from Perez through Somerville will seem only too familiar to anyone acquainted with the Court's changing attitudes
toward criminal procedure generally. The grant of wide discretion to trial judges and the willingness reflected in Gori to presume their conscientious protection of defendants' rights came
naturally to a Court that had yet to decide Mapp v. Ohio93 and
Gideon v. Wainwright.9 4 Downum's stringent restrictions upon re91

1Id. at

469-70.

92 United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971) (Harlan, J.).

367 U.S. 643 (1961).
94 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The permissive attitude toward mistrial reflected in Gori
was striking in that it applied even within the federal system, while the rules extended
to the states in Gideon and Mapp had been applicable in the federal courts long before.
93
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trial were as characteristic of the Warren era as the relaxation of
these rules is of the contemporary Court.
But to see the Court's shifts only in these broad terms obscures the complexity of the issues that mistrial situations present. The cases have shown time and again the difficulty of identifying the relevant factors and of specifying how they are to be
weighed. And individual Justices often have seemed to change
their own views concerning the proper approach. Mr. Justice
Harlan joined in the majority opinion in Gori and in the similarly
conceived Downum dissent, but he then wrote the sweeping plurality opinion in Jorn. Chief Justice Burger joined in the Harlan
opinion inJorn as well as in the Court's sharply contrasting opinion in Somerville. Then, for a unanimous Court in Breed v.
Jones,9" the Chief Justice authored an opinion holding unconstitutional successive trials on the same charges in juvenile and
adult court. The opinion makes only passing reference to
Somerville96 but relies heavily upon the plurality opinion inJorn
for the proposition, crucial to the holding in Breed, that the double jeopardy clause protects against the burden of repeated trials
even in situations posing no risk of governmental harassment. 97
Mr. Justice White joined in the dissents in both Downum and
Jorn, but in Somerville he wrote an opinion that seemed to go
beyondJorn in arguing for stringent limitations upon mistrials.
The inconsistency and ambiguity of the Court's mistrial decisions thus are due only in part to changing personnel on the
Court and changing attitudes toward law enforcement requirements; to some extent they reflect a genuine uncertainty among
the Justices concerning the nature of the competing interests
and the appropriate way to reconcile them. As a result, ambiguities necessarily remain after Somerville with respect to
when a situation might "lend itself to prosecutorial manipulation"; when an alternative should be considered available and
what requirements then follow; and, most fundamentally, when
See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914).

95 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
96 Id. at 539 n.20.
91 Id. at 533. The Court recognized that the successive juvenile and adult trials were
not the result of deliberate governmental harassment but were traceable instead to the
state's desire to expedite juvenile cases by holding the transfer hearing (at which the
juvenile court decides whether to transfer the alleged offender to adult court) simultaneously with the juvenile court hearing to adjudicate guilt. Because the hearing on
guilt necessarily covers much of the same ground as the transfer hearing, resolution of
the two questions in the same proceeding was not in itself unreasonable.
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in mistrial situations the double jeopardy clause might acknowledge an interest against retrial that is independent of the
possibility of governmental bad faith. Under these circumstances, the task of a lower court seeking to determine what constitutes "manifest necessity" is not an enviable one. The response
of the courts to this challenge nevertheless has been instructive.
D. Mistrials Since Somerville:
The Response of the Lower Courts
The few years since Somerville have produced nearly 200
reported appellate decisions involving the propriety of retrial
after mistrial. The opinions amply confirm the Supreme Court's
recurring observation that mistrial cases "escape meaningful
categorization," 98 but they thoroughly refute the Court's equally
frequent but more wishful statement that "it is possible to distill
from them a general approach." 9 9 Little consensus exists among
the courts regarding either the factors that should be analyzed
or the result that should be reached in recurring factual contexts. This section will examine these decisions in detail in order
to identify the few areas in which the decisions tend to agree,
and, more importantly, to illuminate some of the causes of the
disagreement. 0 0 For this purpose, it will be useful to consider in
turn decisions involving:
1. formal defects in the institution of the proceedings
2. juror disqualification
3. illness of participants
4. unavailability of prosecution witnesses
5. prosecutorial misconduct
6. prejudice or error in taking testimony
7. unpreparedness or tardy action by the defense
8. misconduct by the defense
9. difficulties in a joint trial
10. inability of the jury to agree upon a verdict
's Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464 (1973); see Gori v. United States, 367
U.S. 364, 369 (1961); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689-91 (1949).
99 Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464 (1973); see id. at 472 (White, J., dissenting) ("some guidelines have evolved from past cases .... ").
100 It should be noted that in all the decisions discussed in this section, mistrial was
ordered without the defendant's consent. When the defense itself has sought the mistrial, the request normally is assumed to remove any basis for a subsequent double jeopardy claim. See United States v. Dinitz, 96 S. Ct. 1075 (1976). For a discussion of the possible difficulties with this assumption, see text accompanying notes 309-33 infra.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 125:449

1. Formal Defects in the Institution of the Proceedings
Because the Somerville mistrial was prompted by a defective
indictment, cases involving comparable procedural flaws could
be expected to display fairly consistent results. In fact, however,
there has been little uniformity in the decisions. When no plausible alternative to mistrial is available, the situation clearly is controlled by Somerville. Most courts have followed that decision and
have held mistrial proper,10 1 but the California Supreme Court
has barred reprosecution in the absence of any alternative to
mistrial.' 2 Some courts also have upheld reprosecution, however, even when the facts suggested that alternatives to mistrial
existed. For example, a faulty indictment caused one trial court,
sitting without a jury, to declare a mistrial after all testimony had
been completed and the case had been submitted for decision. A
retrial was permitted even though the alternative of proceeding
to judgment in the initial trial, however impracticable in
Somerville, would have involved no expense or inconvenience in
10 3
the case under consideration.
Courts that bar retrial frequently base their holdings on a
conclusion that the defect in the proceedings was "insubstantial." ' 0

4

In such a case, mistrial is considered improper not

because the perceived difficulty could have been cured in
another way, but because the reviewing court determines that
the difficulty would not have required reversal of a conviction
and that the mistrial was therefore unnecessary.
A common thread running through these cases is a total
disregard of the availability of alternatives. And, putting the
California rule to one side, the decisions rather consistently hold
retrial permissible if the procedural defect is fatal, but not
otherwise. The resulting standard hardly can be considered
01 E.g., Vaughn v. State, 52 Ala. App. 377, 292 So. 2d 671, rev'd on other grounds,
293 Ala. 365, 304 So. 2d 6 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1975); State v. Berger, 235
N.W.2d 254 (N.D. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 913 (1976).
102 In People v. Upshaw, 13 Cal. 3d 29, 528 P.2d 756, 117 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1974),
trial had commenced without a jury, although the trial court had not obtained a proper
jury-trial waiver. As soon as the difficulty was discovered, the trial judge declared a
mistrial; retrial was held impermissible even though it was the only conceivable cure
for the problem. The California court thus in effect has adopted the position advocated
by the Somerville dissenters and has prohibited all mistrials except in response to difficulties wholly beyond the control of the prosecution or the trial judge.
103 State v. Russo, 70 Wis. 2d 169, 233 N.W.2d 485 (1975).
104See, e.g., People v. Cobb, 19 Ill.
App. 3d 520, 311 N.E.2d 702 (1974); State v.
Birabent, 305 So. 2d 448 (La. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 825 (1975). But cf. United States
v. Sedgwick, 345 A.2d 465 (D.C. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 966 (1976) (mistrial upheld
when trial judge's finding of fatal defect was erroneous but not unreasonable).
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satisfactory. Under that standard, a court will hold the mistrial
order improper, and immunize the defendant from reprosecution, even if the most scrupulous trial judge incorrectly resolved
a doubtful issue in the murky law of pleading. A court will approve a mistrial, however, regardless of whether the trial judge
diligently attempted to avoid it, if he or she correctly held the
flaw to be substantial. 10 5 Somerville may have encouraged this
unfortunate result by focusing attention upon the relatively
technical question whether a conviction "would have to be reversed on appeal due to an obvious procedural error."'10

6

Con-

sideration instead should be given to the more relevant questions
whether satisfactory alternatives to mistrial existed and whether
the trial judge and the prosecutor attempted to discharge their
obligations in a responsible manner.
2. Juror Disqualification
The trial court's discovery of grounds for juror disqualification, such as bias, traditionally has been considered one of the
obvious grounds for a valid mistrial,' 1 7 and most of the recent
cases support this view. 10 8 Some of these decisions give no consideration to the possible ways of avoiding mistrial; they ignore
the possibilities of probing the extent of prejudice, replacing the
disqualified juror with an alternate, or removing the juror and
proceeding with a reduced panel. 0 9 Other decisions mention the
existence of viable alternatives, yet approve mistrial in spite of
0
them."
One straightforward solution to the juror disqualification
problem is simply to proceed with a jury of eleven. Some trial
1'5The rule allowing mistrial only if the defect is substantial puts the prosecution
in the anomalous position of stressing the seriousness of its own error as a ground for
allowing retrial, while the accused must defend the prosecution's effort and minimize
its shortcomings. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
1'6Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464 (1973).
107
Id. at 463; Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 371 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
JosSee, e.g., United States ex rel. Stewart v. Hewitt, 517 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1975);
Whitfield v. Warden, 486 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974);
People v. Merrill, 18 Il. App. 3d 506, 310 N.E.2d 27 (1974); cf. Cornish v. State, 272
Md. 312, 322 A.2d 880 (1974) (disqualification of judge in trial without jury).
1'9 See, e.g., Williamson v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 507, 515 P.2d 1028 (1973); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 456 Pa. 447, 317 A.2d 616, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 949 (1974). But see
Commonwealth v. Cohen, 65 Pa. D. & C.2d 62 (1974).
1'See, e.g., United States ex rel. Stewart v. Hewitt, 517 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1975);
Jones v. Anderson, 404 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd mere., 522 F.2d 181 (5th Cir.
1975); State v. McDonald, 298 Minn. 449, 215 N.W.2d 607 (1974).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 125:449

judges attempt to obtain the parties' consent to this approach,"'
but, at least in the federal courts, the eleven-member panel is not
considered an available alternative to mistrial if either the de1 12
fendant or the prosecutor objects to it.
The courts justify their failure to pursue other alternatives
on a wide variety of grounds. One federal district court approved a state court's failure to seat a replacement juror in part
because this option was "permissive, rather than mandatory"
under state law. 1 3 The Fifth Circuit upheld a retrial after mistrial in a Mississippi murder prosecution even though an alternate juror already selected could have readily replaced the disqualified member of the panel." 14 The court apparently relied
on the rather flimsy ground that the trial judge thought the
substitution might arouse irrelevant speculation among the remaining jurors. It might be an exaggeration to conclude that
these juror disqualification cases dispense with any obligation to
explore alternatives. Nevertheless, the courts seem to give extraordinary deference to a trial judge's decision to reject an alternative.
Several state courts have taken the lead in insisting upon a
stricter approach. Courts in Maryland" 5 and Illinois" 6 have
found a double jeopardy violation when the judge aborted a trial
without investigating the extent of bias or the possibility of correcting it by cautionary instructions. A New Mexico court has
held that mistrial was improper in the absence of a thorough
exploration of alternatives and an explicit statement by the trial
7
judge of his reasons for rejecting them."
The juror disqualification cases differ significantly from
those involving defects in the institution of the proceedings.
'" See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 507 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 916
(1975).
2
" See United States v. Means, 513 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1975); Parker v. United
States, 507 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975). See also Patton v.
United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) has been read to prohibit juries
of less than 12 members in this situation except upon stipulation of both parties and the
consent of the trial judge. See note 287 infra.
113 Jones v. Anderson, 404 F. Supp. 182, 187 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd mem., 522 F.2d
181 (5th Cir. 1975).
114 Smith v. Mississippi, 478 F.2d 88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1113 (1973).
Carey v. State, 30 Md. App. 594, 353 A.2d 650 (1976).
" People v. Phillips, 29 Il1. App. 3d 529, 331 N.E.2d 163 (1975); People v. Cobb,
19 Ill.
App. 3d 520, 311 N.E.2d 702 (1974).
1" State v. De Baca, 88 N.M. 454, 541 P.2d 634 (Ct. App. 1975); cf. Commonwealth
v. Cohen, 65 Pa. D. & C.2d 62 (1974) (emphasizing the trial judge's duty to specify why
mistrial is necessary).
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Juror disqualification ordinarily results from events wholly
beyond the control of judge and prosecutor. 118 Accordingly, little danger exists that the mistrial problem was triggered by governmental manipulation. If the only purpose of double jeopardy
protection is to guard against this danger, as Somerville may suggest, arguably a search for alternative solutions is unnecessary
and mistrial should be allowed freely in juror disqualification
situations. On the other hand, the absence of manipulation does
not lessen the burden of retrial upon the defendant. If protection against imposition of this burden, as stressed in Jorn, remains part of the function of the double jeopardy clause after
Somerville, a scrupulous search for alternatives, as required by a
minority of the cases, remains appropriate. Interestingly, decisions taking a more permissive attitude toward retrial do not
explicitly attempt to justify their approach in terms of the lack of
any danger of manipulation. Indeed, in most of them such a
justification would have been difficult to advance because facts
often suggested that the judge's failure to examine alternatives
may have proved helpful to the prosecution. 19 In fact, the very
existence of alternatives inevitably creates an opportunity for
manipulation in choosing among them, regardless of the source
of the original difficulty. The cases thus suggest the importance
of providing some control over the trial judge's choice of alternatives, even under the narrower Somerville conception of the
policies served by double jeopardy protection.
3. Illness of Participants
Courts that have considered mistrials based on illness of a
participant have reached conflicting results. The outcome of
such cases may depend, at least in part, upon which participant
becomes ill. Mistrials triggered by illness of the defendant, defense counsel, or the trial judge have been upheld even without
118 In some of the cases, however, contamination of the jury apparently resulted
from negligence on the part of other court officials, such as the bailiff or the marshal
responsible for the jury. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Warden, 486 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974); Smith v. Mississippi, 478 F.2d 88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1113 (1973).
'19 In most of the cases involving a refusal to probe the extent of prejudice or a
refusal simply to caution the juror, the potential bias was apparently in favor of the
defense. See, e.g., Smith v. Mississippi, 478 F.2d 88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1113
(1973); Jones v. Anderson, 404 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd mem., 522 F.2d 181
(5th Cir. 1975); State v. McDonald, 298 Minn. 449, 215 N.W.2d 607 (1974); Williamson
v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 507, 515 P.2d 1028 (1973).
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the defendant's consent. 120 These mistrials were accepted uncritically as "necessary" even though possibilities for a continuance,
replacement of trial counsel, or replacement of the judge 12 1 had
not been explored at the trial. Illness of a juror raises essentially
the same questions as those presented in juror disqualification
cases. Although ordinarily an alternate juror will be seated if one
is available, the court usually will not proceed with a reduced
12 2
panel if either party objects.
Illness of the prosecutor apparently prompts a stricter judicial attitude. In several cases, state courts have barred retrial
because a substitute prosecutor could have been assigned.' 2 3 Yet
these decisions did not suggest the possibility of feigning or manipulation and did not distinguish expressly the problem of illness of the prosecutor from that of illness of defense counsel.
These courts therefore might take an equally strict approach
with regard to illness of other parties.
The illness cases, like those involving juror bias, indicate
possibilities for manipulation even when a problem is ostensibly
beyond the prosecutor's control, and the willingness of trial
judges to overlook alternatives to mistrial could be colored by
their impression of whether a second proceeding would provide
improved prospects for the government. Therefore, the strict
approach implicit in some of these decisions may be appropriate
even when illness of the defendant is involved.
4.

Unavailability of Prosecution Witnesses
Essential testimony sometimes becomes unavailable because
government preparation has been sloppy or because witnesses
become ill or disappear through no fault of the prosecution. If
anything remains of Downum, mistrials should be held improper
when prosecutorial error accounts for the unavailability of a witness, and the cases broadly support this view. In most of these
120See, e.g., United States v. Wayman, 510 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 846 (1976) (defense counsel injured in accident); Commonwealth v. Robson,
461 Pa. 615, 337 A.2d 573, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 934 (1975) (illness ofjudge); Glover v.
United States, 301 A.2d 219 (D.C. 1973) (illness of defendant).
121 Replacement of the trial judge is not authorized in all jurisdictions, see text accompanying note 304 infra, but apparently it is authorized in Pennsylvania, where
Commonwealth v. Robson, 461 Pa. 615, 337 A.2d 573 (1975), cited in note 120 supra,
arose. See PA. R. CRINI. P. 1105(c). But see Commonwealth v. Clay, 224 Pa. Super. Ct.
461, 307 A.2d 341 (1973) (criticizing replacement). See also FFD. R. CRIM. P. 25(a).
122See note 112 supra.
12
Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 341 A.2d 388 (1975); Commonwealth v. Brooks,
225 Pa. Super. Ct. 247, 310 A.2d 338 (1973).
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cases the justification for mistrial was particularly weak because
the alternative of granting a continuance would have readily
solved the problem. 12 4 Courts have barred retrial, however, even
in the absence of any alternative. For example, in McNeal v.
Hollowell, 125 one of the state's principal witnesses, an alleged accomplice to the murder at issue, unexpectedly claimed the
privilege against self-incrimination. Although the prosecutor
might have prevented this eventuality by taking a variety of steps
before trial, the difficulty could not be cured promptly once it
arose. The Fifth Circuit nevertheless held mistrial improper.
The court noted that the prosecutor had taken a gamble with a
doubtful witness and lost; to permit mistrial would create the
''tantalizing potential" for manipulation that the Supreme Court
had warned against in Somerville. McNeal and an analogous decision in the Second Circuit 126 apparently establish that-whatever
the rule in cases of faulty preparation of an indictment-faulty
arrangements by the government for presenting its testimony
will not justify mistrial even in the absence of viable alter27
natives. 1
A different result often occurs when a properly subpoenaed
witness fails to appear through no fault of the government. For
example, in United States ex rel. Gibson v. Ziegele, 1 2 8 mistrial had
been declared by a New Jersey trial court in a murder prosecution because a police officer who was to testify concerning the
defendant's confession became ill. Although another police officer could have testified for this purpose, and although the
record contained indications that the prosecutor's case had been
going poorly, the Third Circuit held that the mistrial decision
124E.g., Fanning v. Superior Ct., 320 A.2d 343 (Del. 1974); State ex rel. Mitchell v.
Walker, 294 So. 2d 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
125481 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S 951 (1974).
126 United States v. Glover, 506 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1974), discussed in note 157 infra.
These decisions confirm the demise of Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 429 (1953),
discussed in text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
127 In McNeal, the case against retrial was particularly strong because one government witness had given testimony unexpectedly favorable to the accused; mistrial therefore deprived the defendant of an important tactical advantage independent of the
other witness' refusal to testify. United States v. Glover, 506 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1974),
discussed in note 157 infra, however, did not appear to involve any specific prejudice to
the defendant apart from the fact that retrial would have permitted the government to
use the missing witness' testimony; nevertheless, mistrial was held improper even in the
absence of alternatives. The prevailing rule is of course quite different when governmental error relates to the preparation of the indictment rather than the preparation of
testimony. See text accompanying notes 10 1-03 supra.
128479 F.2d 773 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1008 (1973).
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was within the trial judge's discretion. 12 9 The decision treated
rather lightly the obligation to canvass alternatives, but it can be
read at least as assuming that some such obligation exists.' 30 In
any event, Gibson plainly holds that when alternatives are
deemed unavailable and when governmental error is not respon3
sible for the witness' absence, retrial will be permitted.1 1
This approach has not been adopted by all courts; at least
two recent decisions have held retrial barred by the double
jeopardy clause even after repeated continuances had failed to
secure the availability of a properly subpoenaed witness.' 32 This
strict attitude toward mistrials that are triggered when a witness
is missing through no fault of the government stands in contrast
to the prevailing approach to mistrials that are prompted by the
illness or indisposition of a judge or juror. Mistrials of the second sort often are upheld with little or no attempt to explore
viable alternatives. 13 3 There is, of course, no reason to distinguish between uncontrollable events that incapacitate a judge
andi-those that prevent the appearance of an essential witness.
But courts that have been conditioned to regard the former as
causing a "breakdown in judicial machinery" aid the latter as
causing a mere failure of proof perhaps understandably have
displayed great permissiveness in one situation and great stringency in the other.
5.

Prosecutorial Misconduct
Prosecutorial misconduct-such as an improper opening
statement, improper questioning of a witness, or failure to make
129 Although the court emphasized that the other police officer would not have
been able to testify that Miranda warnings had been given, its opinion does not suggest
that this difficulty had been relied upon by the trial judge, and when the problem was
raised during the appeal, the defense counsel noted that he would have been willing to
stipulate to the warnings. See id. at 777-78.
13

1 See

also Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 446 Pa. 24, 285 A.2d 189 (1971).

The same result may follow if the prosecution can establish that its difficulties
resulted from misconduct by the defense. Cf. Baker v. State, 15 Md. App. 73, 289 A.2d
131

348 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973) (subornation of perjury observed by
judge in courtroom). In most cases, however, courts have rejected attempts to pin responsibility on the defense. E.g., McNeal v. Hollowell, 481 F.2d 1145, 1151-52 (5th Cir.

1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); People v. Davis, 79 Misc. 2d 137, 359 N.Y.S.2d
637 (Sup. Ct. 1974); cf. United States v. Whitman, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 480 F.2d 1028 (6th Cir. 1973) (defendant caused delay leading to dismissal of the jury).
132United States v. Whitman, 473 F.2d 910, (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 480
F.2d 1028 (6th Cir. 1973); People v. Davis, 79 Misc. 2d 137, 359 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Sup. Ct.

1974).
'33 See text accompanying notes 120-22 supra.
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required disclosures to the defense-often will prompt an affirmative motion by the defendant for mistrial. This occurred in
virtually all the recent mistrial cases involving prosecutorial misconduct; accordingly, the decisions rejecting double jeopardy
claims rest largely on the theory, which will be examined
below, 1 34 that the defendant in effect consented to retrial.'

35

In

at least one case, however, a mistrial opposed by the defendant
was held proper on the ground that the judge's motive had been
to benefit the defense.' 3 6 This reflects a rather plain refusal to
accept the interment of Gori byJorn. 3 7
6.

Prejudice or Error in Taking Testimony
Even in the absence of misconduct by counsel, improper
evidence may be, and of course often is, aired before the jury. If
the testimony is relatively insignificant, the jury simply may be
instructed to disregard it, but if the evidence is highly prejudicial, counsel often will seek a mistrial to ensure that a truly unbiased finder of fact will decide the case. When mistrial orders of
this kind are entered at the request of the prosecution, most
courts considering double jeopardy claims scrutinize closely the
need for mistrial. In one heroin prosecution, for example, an
interpreter improperly translated the Chinese dialect used by a
key government witness.' 3 8 The trial court granted the
government's motion for mistrial so that a qualified translator
could be found and the testimony rendered properly. Because
portions of the original testimony had tended to exculpate one
of the defendants, the mistrial proved to be a great advantage to
the prosecution, which decided not to use the witness at all in
the second trial. The Fifth Circuit barred the retrial because alternatives had not been considered 3 9 and because the opportunity that had been given the prosecution to strengthen its case
See text accompanying notes 309-33 infra.
- See, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 479 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
924 (1973); People v. Forbis, 12 Ill. App. 3d 536, 298 N.E.2d 771 (1973); People v.
Counts, 44 App. Div. 2d 841, 355 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1974); Commonwealth v. McGlory,
226 Pa. Super. Ct. 493, 313 A.2d 326 (1973); State v. Calhoun, 67 Wis. 2d 204, 226
N.W.2d 504 (1975).
136 United States v. Sedgwick, 345 A.2d 465 (D.C. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 966
(1976).
137 See also Rentoul v. State, 301 A.2d 284 (Del. 1973).
See text accompanying notes 70-73 supra.
138 United States v. Kin Ping Cheung, 485 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1973).
"9Id. at 691. The court noted that the trial judge could have ordered a short
continuance while a new translator was obtained and could have instructed the jury to
disregard contested portions of the translation.
134
13
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upon retrial had created a "tantalizing potential for .
1

misconduct."'

40

By refusing to defer to the trial judge's implicit rejection of
problematical alternatives, in a case in which judgment was peculiarly dependent upon the impact of testimony in "the heated
atmosphere of trial," the Fifth Circuit applied a notably strict
double jeopardy standard. The court's approach probably was
appropriate because the mistrial undeniably had prejudiced the
tactical position of the defense. It is nevertheless disappointing
that the court evinced no awareness that its standard differed so
41
strikingly from the one it had employed on other occasions.'
When the improper testimony is prejudicial to the defendant, mistrials granted on a defense motion usually will not bar
retrial.' 4 2 Several cases, however, have upheld mistrials ordered
by the trial judge sua sponte, on the ground that the action was
intended to benefit the defendant. 1 43 These cases simply ignore
44
the emphatic condemnation of this rationale inJorn.1
7. Unpreparedness or Tardy Action by the Defense
When a mistrial is declared because of negligence on the
part of the defense, courts usually allow retrial without careful
examination of the available alternatives. In one federal
"4Id.at 692 (quoting McNeal v. Hollowell, 481 F.2d 1145, 1150 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974)).
14 See, e.g., Smith v. Mississippi, 478 F.2d 88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1113
(1973). See also United States v. White, 524 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S.
Ct. 2629 (1976), discussed in text accompanying notes 145-47 infra. For other cases barring retrial because alternatives were available to cure the prejudice to the prosecution,
see State v. Sedillo, 88 N.M. 240, 243, 539 P.2d 630, 633 (Ct. App. 1975); State v.
Embry, 19 Or. App. 934, 942, 530 P.2d 99, 103 (1974).
Although no recent decisions have found mistrial to be the only available means for
curing an error seriously harmful to the prosecution, the cases seem to assume that
mistrial would be permissible when the harm to the prosecution could be remedied in
no other way. The defendant is, of course, "prejudiced" by an order intended to give
the government a better case upon retrial, but imposing this sort of prejudice seems to
be considered proper if the advantage lost by the defense was an illegitimate one and
alternative solutions were wanting.
142 See, e.g., Conner v. Deramus, 374 F. Supp. 504 (M.D. Pa. 1974); State v. Wright,
112 Ariz. 446, 543 P.2d 434 (1975); City of Tucson v. Valencia, 21 Ariz. App. 148, 517
P.2d 106 (1973); Lawson v. State, 304 So. 2d 522, 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); State
v. Mazurek, 88 N.M. 56, 537 P.2d 51 (Ct. App. 1975); cf. United States v. Jamison, 505
F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (defense counsel's motion for mistrial was based on his own
ineffectiveness).
"I Neal v. State, 272 Md. 323, 322 A.2d 887 (1974); State v. Wiley, 324 N.E.2d
287 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
144 See text accompanying notes 70-73 supra. A District of Columbia court also applied this rationale in a decision involving a mistrial precipitated by prosecutorial misconduct. United States v. Sedgwick, 345 A.2d 465 (D.C. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
966 (1976); see text accompanying notes 134-37 supra.
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prosecution, 1 4 5 the defendant had failed to move for a psychiatric examination until after the jury had been sworn. The trial
judge allowed the untimely motion, but he declined to recess the
trial pending completion of the examination and instead declared a mistrial. The Fifth Circuit held the mistrial order
proper in part because the alternative of a continuance would
have "exposed the jurors to the possibility of extraneous and
impermissible influences."'1 46 This concern was at best premature
because the need for mistrial could have been determined,
under the usual standards for juror disqualification, 47 if and
when jurors actually were exposed to an extraneous influence.
Other decisions, however, go even further and approve mistrial
orders triggered by an untimely defense motion, without any
48
consideration of possible alternatives to mistrial.'
The apparent willingness of reviewing courts to accept superficial reasons for bypassing an alternative may reflect confidence that prosecutorial manipulation is absent when a trial
problem has been caused by negligence on the part of the defense. But, as was noted in the discussion of cases of illness and
juror disqualification, 1 49 selection among alternatives always presents an opportunity for the trial judge to choose the option
most favorable to conviction, even when the government bears
no responsibility for the initial difficulty. Surprisingly, one of the
courts that recognized this danger in the context of illness and
juror disqualification ignored the alternatives question alto50
gether in a case involving error by the defense.1
8. Misconduct by the Defense
Improper defense tactics might be thought to justify mistrials even more readily than mere negligence on the part of the
145 United States v. White, 524 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 2629
(1976).
146Id. at 1252.
147 See text accompanying notes 107-17 supra. Compare the Fifth Circuit's approach
in United States v. Kin Ping Cheung, 485 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1973), discussed in text
accompanying notes 138-41 supra.
14'E.g., State v. Aragon, 89 N.M. 91, 547 P.2d 574 (Ct. App. 1976). If an untimely
motion to suppress forecloses the government's right to appeal a suppression order,
mistrial may become necessary. See, e.g., United States v. Moon, 491 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.
1974). The Aragon court explicitly declined to rely on this theory-the state having indicated no desire to appeal-but nonetheless held that mistrial was proper.
14 See text accompanying notes 119-23 supra.
15 Compare State v. Aragon, 89 N.M. 91, 547 P.2d 574 (Ct. App. 1976) (defense
error), discussed in note 148 & accompanying text supra, with State v. De Baca, 88 N.M.
454, 541 P.2d 634 (Ct. App. 1975) (juror disqualification), discussed in text accompanying note 117 supra.
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defense. In fact, the opposite seems to be the case. A number of
courts have barred retrial even when mistrial was triggered by
absence of the defendant, impermissible cross-examination, or
persistently objectionable behavior by defense counsel. These
courts found mistrial improper in such situations either because
the trial court failed to invoke alternatives such as recessing the
trial, cautioning the jury, or admonishing counsel, 151 or because
52
the misconduct was not sufficiently serious to require mistrial.
Even when the misbehavior has appeared prejudicial to the defense, and the trial judge seemingly sought to protect the defendant by the mistrial order, courts have prohibited retrial. 5 3
Strict scrutiny in these cases may reflect distrust of trial
judge action that is induced by obviously irritating or antagonistic behavior of the defendant or defense counsel. Reviewing
courts may assume that the trial judge will pass more dispassionately upon difficulties occasioned by excusable neglect. Nevertheless, the far more permissive standard that seems to prevail
in the latter situation' 5 4 remains difficult to justify.' 5 5
9.

Difficulties in a Joint Trial

When any of the trial problems already considered arises in
a case involving more than one defendant, the retrial issue becomes much more complex. The easiest cases for the courts to
decide involve situations in which the underlying difficulty
would not justify a mistrial for the defendant primarily affected
by it. In such situations, the courts correctly bar reprosecution of
the second defendant as well as the first.' 56 Similarly, a judge's
151 See United States v. Tinney, 473 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928
(1973) (failure to grant continuance); State v. Sedillo, 88 N.M. 240, 539 P.2d 630 (Ct.
App. 1975) (failure to cure defense counsel misconduct by instruction to the jury);
Commonwealth ex rel. Riddle v. Anderson, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 68, 323 A.2d 115 (1974)
(failure to admonish counsel). But see State ex rel. Walter v. Lee, 320 So. 2d 450 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (mistrial due to defendant's absence held proper).
152See, e.g., Espinoza v. District Court, 180 Colo. 391, 506 P.2d 131 (1973). For a
leading pre-Somerville case to the same effect, see Carsey v. United States, 392 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
153 United States v. Bristol, 325 A.2d 183 (D.C. 1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Riddle
v. Anderson, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 68, 323 A.2d 115 (1974).
154 Compare State v. Aragon, 89 N.M. 91, 547 P.2d 574 (Ct. App. 1976) (mistrial
upheld although untimely motion to suppress was excusable misconduct), with State v.
Sedillo, 88 N.M. 240, 539 P.2d 630 (Ct. App. 1975) (mistrial held improper even
though defense misconduct resulted in contempt citation).
155 See text accompanying notes 146-50 supra.
156 For example, in Fanning v. Superior Court, 320 A.2d 343 (Del. 1974), one defendant had demanded time to consult an expert before the admission into evidence of a
government expert's report, but her codefendant raised no objection to the evidence.
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willingness to sever the cases and limit the mistrial to only one
defendant does not dispense with the need to determine
157
whether even the limited mistrial was appropriate.
Determining the legitimacy of mistrial in the joint trial context becomes more difficult when mistrial for one of the defendants would be considered proper. For example, in Whitfield v.
Warden, 1 58 two black defendants were tried on charges of murder and conspiracy in a Maryland court. While motions were
being argued at the end of the prosecution's case-in-chief, one of
the jurors-the only black on the panel-wandered into the
courtroom. Whitfield's lawyer wished to proceed with either the
original juror or the alternate, who was white. Counsel for
codefendant Baker, however, moved for a mistrial. The trial
judge felt that seating the alternate would be unfair to Baker
and declared a mistrial with respect to both defendants. After
retrial, the Fourth Circuit held that the second prosecution did
not subject Whitfield to double jeopardy. Although mistrial
could have been avoided by severing the charges against Whitfield, the court held that severance need not be selected as an
The trial judge responded by declaring a mistrial for both defendants. On appeal, the
state supreme court properly barred the retrial of the first defendant, because a short
continuance would have met her needs; a fortiori, the court held that reprosecution of
the second defendant was also impermissible.
157 Joint trials involving confessions illustrate this point. Under Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the confession of one defendant, though legally obtained,
may not be introduced in a joint trial if he or she does not take the stand and if the
confession contains material damaging to a codefendant. In several recent cases, a prosecutor facing suppression under Bruton of a valid confession sought a mistrial so that
the defendants could be prosecuted separately and the statement used against the defendant who had made it. In two of these cases, the trial judge severed the actions and
aborted only one of the prosecutions. Nevertheless, courts subsequently barred retrial
of the defendant whose original prosecution had been aborted. United States v. Clover,
506 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1974) (mistrial for the defendant who had confessed); Painter v.
Martin, 531 P.2d 341 (Okla. Grim. App. 1974) (confession used in first trial; mistrial for
the defendant who had not confessed).
Once trial begins in these cases, the difficulty cannot be avoided by any alternative
short of the limited mistrial. Nevertheless, the decisions holding mistrial improper are
correct because the problem results solely from the government's negligent failure to
seek severance prior to trial. Cf. McNeal v. Hollowell, 481 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 197I),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974) (witness unavailability due to prosecution negligence),
discussed in text accompanying notes 125-27 supra. See also text accompanying note 266
infra. Given these decisions, the prosecutor who neglects to seek severance before trial
faces the dilemma of choosing either to proceed without the confession or to use the
confession against the defendant who made it and accept dismissal of the other
defendants case. Clearly the prosecution cannot gain by proceeding solely against the
defendant who did not confess, as the government did in Glover, because the co~nfession
still cannot be used in the first trial and retrial of the defendant who confessed will be
barred.
158 486 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974).
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alternative to mistrial in a conspiracy prosecution because of the
"problems and prejudices" that this course might create for the
government. 159 The Eighth Circuit reached a similar result in
Parker v. United States.16 0 There, after exposure to prejudicial
publicity had disqualified one juror, Parker agreed to proceed
with a jury of eleven, but his codefendant refused. The court
upheld the trial judge's refusal to sever and his declaration of
mistrial with respect to both defendants. Two recent cases from
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have reached the opposite result,
holding that when valid grounds for mistrial arise with respect to
one defendant, and the judge fails to sever and proceed with the
6
case against the other, retrial of the latter defendant is barred.' 1
Neither the decisions allowing retrial nor those barring retrial provide much elaboration of their conclusions. For example, the Sixth Circuit case barring the codefendant's retrial indicated simply that severance was the appropriate remedy, 1 62 while
the Fifth Circuit, in the most recent of the four decisions, stated
flatly that "[m]ere judicial convenience in handling coconspirators in the same trial has never been held to constitute
an interest in the magnitude of a 'manifest necessity.' 163 A conflict of this kind probably was inevitable because the Supreme
Court's opinion in Somerville, with its ambivalent treatment of the
alternatives analysis in Jorn, provided little guidance for determining when the government's interest in trying cases jointly
becomes sufficiently important to justify rejection of the sever16 4
ance alternative.
10.

Inability of the Jury To Agree upon a Verdict
Courts traditionally have regarded the "hung" jury, which
alone accounts for several thousand mistrials each year, 65 as the
classic basis for a valid mistrial.' 6 6 Although the recent cases
uniformly profess adherence to this general principle, it has be159

Id. at 1124.

Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975).
United States v. Alford, 516 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1975); Thomas v. Beasley, 491
F.2d 507 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 955 (1974).
162 Thomas v. Beasley, 491 F.2d 507, 510 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 955
(1974).
160507 F.2d 587 (8th
161

163 United States v. Alford, 516 F.2d 941, 947 (5th Cir. 1975).
164 See text accompanying notes

86-87 supra. For a suggested resolution of this

issue, see text accompanying notes 294-302 infra.
165 Kalven and Zeisel estimated that in 1955, more than five percent of all criminal

jury trials, or approximately 3000 trials in that year, had ended in hung juries. H.
KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 453 (1966).
166 See Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 370-71 (1961)

(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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come a largely meaningless rubric because courts differ so
sharply in their conception of what constitutes genuine "inability" of a jury to agree.
This disagreement among courts is due in part to the variations in the thoroughness of accepted techniques for preventing
jury deadlock. Good trial practice requires a judge to determine
whether further deliberations will be futile by questioning the
jurors and by considering the nature and complexity of the case,
the length of the trial, and the time spent in deliberations. 1 67 A
judge may summon the jury to inquire into the status of its
deliberations or may follow instead the more cautious procedure
of waiting until the jury takes the initiative. The judge may question only the foreperson or may poll the other jurors as well. A
jury's firm statement of deadlock may be accepted by the judge
or further deliberations may instead be required, with or without
additional instructions relating to elements in the case, the burden of proof, or the nature of the unanimity requirement.
The hung-jury problem thus resembles other trial difficulties in that a range of alternatives to immediate mistrial may be
available. In the hung-jury situation, however, efforts to break
deadlock inherently involve a degree of pressure that may, precisely because of its success, taint the fairness of the resulting
verdict. The judge accordingly must tread a thin line between
discharging a jury too quickly and not discharging it quickly
enough.
Given these constraints, the prevailing approach among
courts deciding double jeopardy claims has been to accord great
deference to the trial judge's finding that the jury was unable to
agree. 1 6 8 Indeed, most courts uphold mistrials even when the
trial judge relied on the foreperson's statement without polling
the other jurors, 69 failed to assure that the deadlock applied to
all counts,17 0 or denied a defense request to reread the charge
71
on the burden of proof.'
167 ABA STANDARDS RELATING

(1968).

TO

TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4(c),

Comment

at 157

168 See, e.g., United States v. Medansky, 486 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 989 (1974); Jessen v. State, 234 Ga. 791, 218 S.E.2d 52 (1975); Commonwealth v. Fredericks, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 78, 340 A.2d 498 (1975).
169 See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 497 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1974); Thames v.
Justices of Superior Court, 383 F. Supp. 41 (D. Mass. 1974); State v. Nelson, 234
N.W.2d 368, 375 (Iowa 1975); State v. Pruitt, 216 Kan. 103, 107, 531 P.2d 860, 863
(1975); White v. State, 23 Md. App. 151, 166, 326 A.2d 219, 228 (1974).
170 See, eg., United States v. Medansky, 486 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 989 (1974).
171 See, e.g., United States v. Beckerman, 516 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1975).
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United States v. Beckerman, 1 72 though not the worst of these
decisions, is probably typical of this approach. In a relatively
uncomplicated narcotics prosecution, the jury sent the judge a
deadlock note late in the evening but after only three hours of
deliberation. In response to the judge's question whether agreement might be reached with more time, the following colloquy
ensued:
The Forelady: It is very hard to say. We are all very
tired . . . maybe another time, another day we may be
clearer.
The Court: The question I asked you was whether you
thought with more time you would be able to reach a
verdict, so the answer is no, is that it?
The Forelady: The way it seems now, it doesn't seem as
though we will be able to.
[Defense Counsel]: May I make a suggestion?
The Court: No, you may not. Thank you very much.
The Court is going to declare a mistrial, the jury is
173
excused.
Despite available alternatives, such as allowing the jury to rest
overnight, and despite the judge's flat refusal to consider the
views of defense counsel, the Second Circuit upheld this mistrial
declaration. The court stated that the judge was entitled to accept the deadlock claim "at face value" and interpreted Somerville
as reaffirming the Gori notion of broad discretion for the trial
judge. The court concluded by "[c]autioning against scrutinizing
74
the exercise of that discretion.'
Some courts have given closer scrutiny to the trial judge's
hung-jury determination, although their decisions seem to represent a minority position. In United States ex rel. Russo v.
Superior Court,1 7 5 a New Jersey murder prosecution had been
aborted after nine hours of jury deliberation because the judge
172
7

Id.

1 3 Id. at 908.
74 Id. at 908, 910. For another example of a relatively permissive approach, see

Commonwealth v. Monte, 459 Pa. 495, 329 A.2d 836 (1974), in which the court upheld
a Philadelphia trial judge's decision to relieve the jury of further deliberations on the
ground that it would be unsafe for them to return home at a later hour. The court
noted, however, that the trial judge had "every reason to believe that further deliberations would have been futile." Id. at 505, 329 A.2d at 841. See also State v. Nelson, 234
N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1975) (holding that although it would have been preferable for the
judge to ask the jury to return in the morning for further deliberations, failure to do so
was not an abuse of discretion).
175 483 F.2d 7 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973).
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believed that the jury was exhausted. The Third Circuit held
retrial barred by the double jeopardy clause. Although the mistrial determination was peculiarly dependent upon firsthand observation and presumably was designed to protect all parties
from an ill-considered verdict, the court rejected the trial judge's
finding as unsupported by the record because the jury itself had
1 76
not formally complained of exhaustion.
Russo was extended significantly in United States ex rel. Webb
v. Court of Common Pleas.1 77 In Webb, the judge had summoned
the jury and inquired whether "your positions are so adamant
that you couldn't possibly arrive at a unanimous verdict?" The
foreperson had responded firmly, "Yes, sir ... ". .,178The Third
Circuit nevertheless held the mistrial improper. The opinion
stressed the "narrow limits" upon a trial judge's discretion and
took its cue from passages in Somerville that stated that the exercise of this discretion is to be "scrutinized.' ' 7 9 As in Russo, the
court saw a potential for manipulation because the judge had
taken the initiative in raising the deadlock question. In such a
situation, the judge's readiness to cut off deliberations could
be influenced by his or her impression of their probable
outcome.18 0 Furthermore, because the judge had not expressly
polled each juror, the record did "not furnish an adequate showing that it was the collective sentiment of the jury that they had
reached an impasse."1 81 The Webb opinion thus requires a trial
court to question each juror whenever the jury has not spontaneously claimed deadlock.' 8 2 A few other decisions also suggest
176 Id. at 16-17. See also State v. Fenton, 19 Ariz. App. 274, 506 P.2d 665 (1973);
Tuite v. Shaw, 49 App. Div. 2d 737, 372 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1975); United States v. See, 505
F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975) (no abuse of discretion where
judge polled jurors and made extensive deadlock determination).
177516 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1975).
17
1d. at 1036.
179 Id. at 1042 (quoting Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 452, 462-63 (1973)).
180This danger was particularly acute in Russo because of allegations that the jury's
deliberations had been overheard through the thin walls of the jury room. 483 F.2d at
9. But the court disclaimed reliance on this factor, stressing that an examination of
possible manipulation in particular cases would cause the court to "become embroiled in
embarrassing inquiries." Id. at 16 n.15. Likewise, in Webb, the court stressed that there
had been no hint of manipulation and that its conclusion rested solely on the general
danger that "the procedure utilized by the trial judge here to determine whether there
was a hung jury is open to abuse." 516 F.2d at 1044 n.57.
181 516 F.2d at 1044.
182The court mentioned, however, that there "might" be less necessity for polling

the other jurors when the jury has spontaneously claimed deadlock, because "the jury
would presumably have reached a consensus before reporting its deadlock to the
judge." Id. at 1044 n.56.
It should be noted that Webb involved a challenge to the discharge of the jury at
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that a court's initiation of deadlock inquiries'8 3 or its failure to
question the jurors individually 1 84 may render a mistrial improper, and at least one recent case suggests that failure to provide supplementary instructions or to insist upon continued deliberations after a jury's first protestation of deadlock may have
the same effect.' 85 Such decisions probably allow some flexibility
in the judge's response to potential deadlock situations, but they
plainly require trial judges, before dismissing a hung jury, to
build a record sufficiently substantial to survive searching review
by a court examining a double jeopardy claim.
The decisions thus reflect sharply contrasting perceptions of
the nature of the jury deadlock problem. Most courts view a
hung jury as a special situation that involves little danger to the
defendant and that justifies mistrial almost automatically. An
important minority, however, recognizes the potential for abuse
in this situation and consequently subjects mistrial decisions to
the most rigorous scrutiny.
11.

The Current State of the Law
The first step toward understanding the current state of
double jeopardy law in mistrial cases is to abandon all pretense
of explaining the decisions in terms of the "manifest necessity
standard." That standard cannot explain the welter of criteria
utilized by the courts for determining the propriety of mistrial.
the defendant's second trial. The first trial also had ended in a hung jury, and the court
mentioned this fact as one "mandating the exercise of even greater caution" before
discharging the second jury. Id. at 1045. Although one commentator has concluded that
Webb's restrictions upon the trial judge's discretion apply only in this situation, Note,
Double Jeopardy: Discretion of a TrialJudge to Declare a Mistrial on the Basis of a Hung Jury,
44 FORDHAM L. REV. 389, 395 (1975), the decision cannot be limited to this situation.
Russo involved only one trial, and the Webb court stressed the extensive obligations of
the trial judge and reviewing court in hung jury situations generally; the court referred
to the prior hung jury as merely a "final factor." 516 F.2d at 1045.
1 3
" See Tuite v. Shaw, 49 App. Div. 2d 737, 372 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1975).
1'4Koehler v. State, 519 P.2d 442 (Alas. 1974); Commonwealth v. Bartolomucci,
232 Pa. Super. Ct. 559, 335 A.2d 747 (1975).
"' Koehler v. State, 519 P.2d 442, 449 (Alas. 1974). The situation in Koehler was
particularly egregious in that the judge failed to contact either the defendant or his
counsel before discharging the jury. The court's language suggested, however, that the
judge's obligation to canvass a wide range of alternatives would have been applicable
even if the defense had been present.
An analogous situation was presented in United States v. Gordy, 526 F.2d 631 (5th
Cir. 1976). There a federal judge, pressured by a crowded docket and a scheduled
sitting in another city, dismissed the jury without proof that their deadlock was permanent. The judge cut off defense objections by declaring, "I can make my plane if you
will just get off my back long enough for me to do it." Id. at 634. Although the jury
had made an unequivocal claim of deadlock on its own initiative, the Fifth Circuit held
that retrial was barred.
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Even on the most general level, decisions often shift erratically
between close scrutiny of the trial judge's determination and
complete deference to it. In fact, the Perez opinion approved
both of these approaches simultaneously, 18 6 and subsequent
cases, including the recent lower court rulings, have faithfully
perpetuated this ambivalence. The notion that "manifest necessity" refers to any one "standard," even in terms of a basic
threshold approach, is simply a myth.
Even less accurate than the concept of a single standard is
the notion that the words "manifest necessity" serve any useful
descriptive role. First, the "necessity" concept was never intended to be exclusive: Perez approved of mistrial when "there is
a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice
would otherwise be defeated."1 8 Moreover, cases such as
Somerville amply confirm that mistrial may be proper even when
not strictly necessary. Conversely, mistrial may be improper and
retrial barred even when termination of the proceedings is admittedly necessary. Such a result may occur when the prosecu88
tion deliberately creates irreparable prejudice to the defense
or finds itself unable to make out a prima facie case.' 8 9 Finally, if
the "necessity" concept is not always helpful, it need hardly be
added that, whatever it means, it is seldom "manifest." In short,
the "manifest necessity standard" is a traditionally sanctioned but
nonetheless thoroughly deceptive misnomer, perhaps not rivaled
even by the Holy Roman Empire.
If the "manifest necessity" formula provides no guidance for
understanding mistrial decisions, may the decisions be explained
by other standards? The answer appears to be no. In a few of
the areas considered, one overall approach tends to predominate, 190 and conflicting decisions can be dismissed as aberrant
or erroneous. But in most instances, no thread of consistency is
discernible. The cases provide little guidance for resolving is186 See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
187 United

States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824) (emphasis supplied).
See text accompanying notes 57 supra & 321-23 infra.
188 See text accompanying notes 125-27 supra.
190The only areas in which this seems to be true are prosecutorial misconduct, text
accompanying notes 134-37 supra (§ 5), and prejudice or error in the taking of testimony, text accompanying notes 138-44 supra (§ 6). Although the most recent decisions
involving unpreparedness by the defense, text accompanying notes 145-50 supra (§ 7),
and misconduct by the defense, text accompanying notes 151-55 supra (§ 8), do appear
to be internally consistent, the prevalent view in the unpreparedness cases is difficult to
reconcile with the very different attitude that prevails in the misconduct cases. See text
accompanying notes 154-55 supra.
's

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 125:449

sues left open by Somerville; indeed, the recent decisions rarely
offer useful commentary on the earlier cases or on the underlying double jeopardy interests.19 '
This problem is not attributable solely to the unlimited variety of circumstances in which mistrial questions arise. Even when
faced with identical circumstances within the narrowest of
categories, courts often adopt conflicting approaches. As noted
above, some courts approve mistrials without seriously considering available alternatives, while others require a "scrupulous"
search for alternatives and approve mistrials only when the need
is compelling. A third group of courts holds mistrial improper in
some situations even when no alternative is available.
These conflicts remain even if the analysis is refined to include the three other factors emphasized in Supreme Court
decisions-the source of the trial difficulty, the potential for
manipulation, and the identifiable prejudice to the defendant.
Prejudice to the defendant rarely is shown, and even then some
courts continue to apply a permissive standard. 92 Such decisions
may be explained by the absence of a potential for manipulation
or of an available alternative, but these elements themselves are
far from self-defining. A potential for manipulation can be
found in situations of illness, jury deadlock, or almost any other
trial difficulty, including even situations in which the defendant's
own misconduct precipitates the mistrial.' 93 The availability of
alternatives is likewise primarily a matter of degree. The determination of whether these elements are present may therefore
turn largely on how closely the reviewing court examines the
basis for the trial judge's determination. But if for some courts a
potential for manipulation triggers strict examination of the al'9 Statutory standards are similarly unhelpful. Many provide simply that mistrial is
proper "only for reasons of manifest necessity," e.g., PA. R. CRIM. P. l1 8(b), or, for
example, "when it is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with
law," e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 280.10(3) (McKinney 1971). The Model Penal Code
likewise does not attempt statutory resolution of the issues that have divided the courts;
it indicates only that retrial after mistrial is permissible, for example, if "prejudicial
conduct ... makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice" or if "the
jury is unable to agree upon a verdict." MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(4)(b)(3)-(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See also NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 704(d)(ii) (1970).

192 See, e.g., United States v. White, 524 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 2629 (1976) (additional charges added to the indictment prior to the second trial),
discussed in text accompanying notes 145-47 supra; United States ex rel. Gibson v. Ziegele,
479 F.2d 773 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1008 (1973) (loss of tactical advantage at
the first trial).
193See text accompanying notes 119, 123, 149-50, 154 & 180 supra.
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ternatives issue, for others the very availability of alternatives
signals the potential for manipulation. 194 Under these circumstances, even an analysis that considers the four factors simultaneously seems hopelessly inadequate.
One possible reading of this situation is that no overall
guidelines, no matter how complex, can prove satisfactory, and
that confusing, contradictory decisions must be accepted as inevitable. Much of the difficulty, however, appears traceable to
efforts by the courts to rely primarily on such elusive touchstones as the potential for manipulation or the availability of
alternatives. In an attempt to avoid the problems engendered by
this approach, the following sections undertake an evaluation of
the interests affected by a mistrial decision and develop a
framework within which the significance of these interests in
particular cases can be better understood. Although the discussion may be viewed as a commentary upon the proper content of
the "manifest necessity" standard, it is probably more useful to
regard the analysis as one intended to provide a replacement for
that artificial formulation.

III.

DETERMINING THE PROPRIETY OF RETRIAL AFTER MISTRIAL

A.

The Interests Affected

Commentary upon the double jeopardy clause, both in the
decisions and elsewhere, alludes to a number of important interests favoring or opposing reprosecution after mistrial. But

reliable guidelines for reconciling the competing interests are
rarely suggested; the stricter decisions tend simply to stress the
importance of considerations opposing reprosecution, while the
more permissive decisions emphasize the strength of the interests favoring retrial. The present section focuses attention
upon each of these interests. It concludes that some of them
ought to be disregarded altogether in mistrial cases, and that for
those that remain, reliable benchmarks are usually available to
indicate their importance in the particular case. On the basis of
these conclusions, subsequent sections suggest a general
framework for determining the propriety of retrial following
mistrial, and apply the suggested approach to several specific
mistrial problems.
194

See text accompanying note 119 supra.
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1. Interests Favoring Reprosecution
The considerations supporting retrial after a mistrial declaration in any given situation are of two kinds-first, those that
justify a decision to terminate the proceedings in the first instance, and second, those that justify deference to the trial
judge's initial decision by a court subsequently confronting a
double jeopardy claim.
Many different factors may underlie the initial mistrial decision. Some of these, such as death or illness, are normally
beyond mortal control. Others are perfectly avoidable in theory
but nevertheless recur. Indictments may be served improperly,
vital witnesses may not be served at all.' 95 Jurors may obtain
improper information by entering the courtroom after they
supposedly have been excluded, 1 96 by remaining outside the
courtroom when they were supposed to return, 1 9 7 or by simply
asking the marshal for it directly.' 98 Although prohibition of
reprosecution in these situations might prevent some of this
carelessness, much of it undoubtedly will occur in any event. The
government's interest in obtaining one reasonable opportunity to
establish the defendant's guilt therefore provides a strong impetus for permitting mistrial and a subsequent prosecution.
Interests favoring deference to the initial mistrial decision
are of less force. Nonetheless, arguments grounded on the severe consequences of upholding a double jeopardy claim and on
the proximity of trial judges to the events leading to mistrial
have merit in some situations. A related argument based on considerations of federalism also has been advanced, but its relevance in double jeopardy cases is questionable.
The consequence of upholding a claim that mistrial was ordered improperly cannot be a new trial, because the defendant's
challenge is precisely to the propriety of any further proceedings. As a result, error in declaring mistrial, unlike nearly all
other trial errors, confers upon the defendant immunity from
1
' E.g., Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734-(1963) (witness not served); United
States v. Alford, 516 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1975) (improperly served indictment).
196 Whitfield v. Warden, 486 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876
(1974) (juror entered courtroom during argument on motions).
197United States v. Walden, 448 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1971), vacated, 458 F.2d 36 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 867 (1972) (juror observed defendant in handcuffs).
198Holmes v. United States, 284 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1960) (improper conversation

with marshal); cf. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 456 Pa. 447, 317 A.2d 616 (1974) (the
tipstaff-the court official charged with safeguarding the jury-was the father of the
victim); Commonwealth v. Bromage, 73 Lack. J. 131 (Pa. C.P. 1972) (defendant conversed with a juror during recess).
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punishment for the crimes at issue. This consideration undoubtedly explains the visible reluctance of courts to second-guess the
initial mistrial ruling when considering double jeopardy
claims.' 9 9 Any mistrial guidelines, if they are to be workable,
must accept this reluctance as a fact of life, just as the doctrine
permitting retrial after reversal of a conviction has been framed
partly in response to similar attitudes.2 0 0 And this hindsight
problem reflects concerns that probably should be regarded as
legitimate, at least in some cases. Even though a court confronting a double jeopardy claim might have resolved the mistrial
problem differently in the first instance, the court properly can
weigh its confidence in the validity of its own view-or the relative advantages of its approach-against the costs imposed by
reversal. These costs are particularly substantial when the defendant has been convicted in a retrial that was scrupulously fair,
and when the reprosecution has not caused any specifically identifiable prejudice to the defendant. In cases of this kind, when
the trial judge's ruling, however erroneous, appears to have been
reached in good faith, there will be a legitimate basis for some
degree of deference to that determination.
The second reason for deference-that the trial judge is
better able to determine the need for mistrial because of his or
her proximity to the events-was advanced repeatedly in the
earlier cases2 0 1 and has continued to appear in recent lower
court decisions, notably in the hung-jury context. 20 2 Yet, in many
of these cases, the matters in issue did not turn on direct familiarity with the "heated atmosphere" of the particular trial; deference was therefore wholly inappropriate. Moreover, the proximity notion retains only partial validity even in cases requiring an
assessment of the impact of prejudicial comments or the usefulness of a cautionary instruction to cure them. If comments are
prejudicial to the prosecution, the trial judge plainly cannot be
guided solely by the solutions proposed by the defendant, and
some deference may be justified when mistrial is ordered over
defense objections. If the event seems prejudicial to the accused,
but the defense does not affirmatively seek mistrial, Gori and its
199See, e.g., text accompanying notes 113-14, 146-47 & 168-74 supra.
209 United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
201 See, e.g., Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961); cf. Wade v. Hunter, 336
U.S. 684, 692 (1949) (court martial in battle zone presented "extraordinary reasons" for
deference to judgment of the commanding general).
202 See text accompanying notes 168-74 supra.
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progeny 20 3 suggest the need for special deference to the trial
judge so that he or she will not be discouraged from vigilant
protection of the defendant. This concern, however, is wholly
misplaced. Defense counsel is as well situated as the judge to
assess the impact of incidents that are potentially prejudicial to
the accused. The usefulness of mistrial to the defense depends,
moreover, not only on the impact of the particular event but also
on two other factors-the nature of other circumstances that
may have helped or hindered the defendant's cause, and the
extent to which the resources of the accused will permit an adequate defense in a second trial. 20 4 A trial judge normally will
have only vague familiarity with the first of these factors and
none at all with the second. Deference to the trial judge therefore seems particularly inappropriate when the mistrial decision
ostensibly was intended to protect an accused who objected to
mistrial or was given no opportunity to do so. In such a case,
there is no excuse for not ascertaining defense preferences directly and then honoring them.
Finally, the Supreme Court has suggested that considerations of federalism provide an important reason for deferring to
state decisions permitting retrial after mistrial, once these decisions have been upheld in the state appellate system. 20 5 Because
Benton v. Maryland20 6 requires the validity of every state mistrial
decision to be tested by the same double jeopardy standards
applicable in federal courts, the Court has stressed the need to
make constitutional requirements sufficiently flexible to be
workable in diverse procedural systems.
This concept of flexibility is sound enough in principle, but
mistrial standards are in any event so flexible that special consideration of this factor is inappropriate. In the usual mistrial case,
the Court is not called upon to approve a single rule of pleading
for all state and federal courts, but rather to determine the validity of an application of a state rule under particular circumstances. Despite the incorporation into the fourteenth
amendment of the "specifics" of the double jeopardy clause,
the question presented under the federal standard of "manifest
203

See text accompanying notes 136-37, 143-44 & 172-74 supra.

204 Similarly, a defendant unable to obtain pretrial release might prefer to complete

the first trial in order to avoid extending the period of incarceration prior to the eventual verdict. Cf. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973) (state may deny "good time"
credit for time served in custody prior to sentencing).
205 Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1973).
206 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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necessity" is therefore scarcely different from the one that had
been posed in review of state court decisions prior to Benton:
whether the mistrial was essentially unfair under the "totality" of
the circumstances. In this context, evaluation of the constitutional claim requires an inevitably flexible determination, but
the Court has instead occasionally invoked the federalism concept as a basis for simply accepting at face value the consequences
of state practice, no matter how outmoded or technical.2 °7 This
result cannot be justified by the Court's traditional and proper
reluctance to impose rigid limitations upon procedure in the
fifty states. Considerations of federalism notwithstanding, federal courts considering double jeopardy claims should not hesitate to assess fully the actual impact of local rules in the context
of the particular case.
2.

Interests Opposing Reprosecution
The interests at the heart of the double jeopardy clause
were well summarized by Mr. Justice Black in Green v. United
States: 208
The underlying idea . . . is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in
a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he
20 9
guilty.
found
be
may
For the purpose of assessing the force of these interrelated considerations, it will be useful to focus attention upon two separate
207 For example, in Duncan v. Tennessee, 405 U.S. 127 (1972), a robbery trial had
been aborted because the state's proof showed that the defendant had used a "22 rifle,"
not the "pistol" alleged in the indictment. The defendant was later prosecuted on a
corrected indictment, and the state courts upheld the conviction-not on the theory
that there was "manifest necessity" to terminate the first trial but rather on the theory
that the second trial was not for precisely the same offense. State v. Brooks, 224 Tenn.
712, 715, 462 S.W.2d 491, 493 (1970). After argument, the Supreme Court dismissed
certiorari as improvidently granted, assigning as a reason that the double jeopardy
issues were excessively intertwined "with rules of criminal pleading peculiar to the State
of Tennessee." 405 U.S. at 127. This view of the problem seems to ignore, or treat as inappropriate for Supreme Court consideration, the question whether the impact of the
state's rules of procedure, under all the circumstances, poses a serious threat to double
jeopardy interests. See also Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 468 (1973).
208 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
209
1d. at 187-88.
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notions alluded to by Mr. Justice Black. The first notion is that
reprosecution is undesirable because it subjects the defendant to
serious burdens even if the defendant is acquitted at retrial.
Among these harms are the delay, strain, and expense associated
with retrial. The second notion is that reprosecution is dangerous because it actually enhances the likelihood of conviction. In
particular, retrial encroaches upon the defense's special interest
in preserving a potentially favorable tribunal.
a. Delay
Mistrial opinions often include the delay resulting from mistrial among the hazards to be prevented by double jeopardy
safeguards. 2 10 This delay may impede the preparation of the
defendant's case and thereby increase the likelihood of conviction. But even in the absence of this danger, mistrial prolongs
the period during which a defendant is subject to "embarrassment .... anxiety and insecurity." It may also extend the period
of a defendant's incarceration prior to sentencing. 2 1' Whether or
not the prosecution delays the proceedings deliberately, to subject the defendant to these burdens, the defendant's interest in
eliminating or minimizing these harms is great.
Unfortunately, limitations upon reprosecution after mistrial
can contribute little to protecting defendants against delay. Most
delay occurs in the course of pretrial proceedings, before
jeopardy is deemed to attach. And once the trial begins, further
delay may be occasioned by continuances, which are almost
never held to violate double jeopardy restrictions, even after
postponements of one month or longer. 21 2 Indeed, decisions
210 See, e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 469 (1973); id. at 472 (White, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (Harlan, J.); Downum v.
United States, 372 U.S. 734, 739 n.* (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting).
211 See

note 204 supra.

212 See, e.g., United States v. Cummings, 507 F.2d 324 (8th Cir. 1974) (seven-week
delay to allow prosecutor to prepare rebuttal testimony); People v. Clemmons, 208 Cal.
App. 2d 696, 25 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1962) (one-month delay until victim-witness, previously
held in contempt, finally agreed to testify). The Supreme Court likewise has assumed
that the double jeopardy clause normally does not bar a continuance, even when the
delay affords the prosecution an opportunity to strengthen its case. See Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1970). See also note 81 supra. This assumption is sound because the continuance, though enabling the government to strengthen its case, preserves the original tribunal and the testimonial content of the trial. Double jeopardy
claims therefore are inapposite, although other problems may be involved.
For an unusual situation involving a double jeopardy violation as a result of a continuance, see State v. O'Keefe, 135 N.J. Super. 430, 440, 343 A.2d 509, 515 (Union
County Ct. 1975) (continuance should not bar resumption of trial "unless [as here] the
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often hold mistrial improper precisely because the judge did riot
deal with a trial problem by ordering a continuance.2 1 3 Thus,
double jeopardy doctrine is not, and probably never could be,
useful for ensuring prompt disposition of the case. The constitutional right to a speedy trial provides the natural framework
within which this problem can be addressed. In addition to its
important role in preventing delay prior to trial, the right to a
speedy trial is available to limit continuances during trial, 2 14 and
it has been the basis for a number of decisions barring reprosecution on account of undue delay following mistrial.2 15
b.

Other Burdens of Importance Irrespective of Effect on Outcome
A second prosecution will expose the accused again to the
personal strain of trial. It also will result in substantial additional
expense, at least for a nonindigent defendant; indeed, one recent case chronicles the defendant's transition from retained to
appointed counsel over the course of four trials on the same
charges.21 6 The strain and expense of retrial are particularly
troublesome when they hamper the defendant's chances for acquittal, or when they result from deliberate harassment by the
neglect [by the prosecutor] is inexcusable and the continuance is an unreasonable break
in the continuity of the trial"); cf. People v. Golden, 55 Cal. 2d 358, 370, 359 P.2d 448,
454, 11 Cal. Rptr. 80, 86 (1961) (en banc) (four-day continuance not improper in itself,
but combined with questionable conduct by prosecutor, required reversal).
213 See, e.g., United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (Harlan, J.); United States v.
Kin Ping Cheung, 485 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1973).
214 Speedy trial requirements do not cease merely because trial has begun; the
reasonableness of midtrial delay still must be tested by speedy trial standards. See
United States v. Cummings, 507 F.2d 324, 330 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Morse,
491 F.2d 149, 156-57 (1st Cir. 1974).
2
'E.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (indefinite delay); United
States v. Lombardo, 378 F. Supp. 727 (W.D.N.Y. 1974) (two-year delay); United States
v. McWilliams, 69 F. Supp. 812 (D.D.C. 1946), aff'd, 163 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1947)
(two-year delay).
For cases finding no speedy-trial violation in spite of significant delay between the
mistrial and the start of the retrial, see United States v. Bettenhausen, 499 F.2d 1223
(10th Cir. 1974) (ten-month delay); Wright v. Boles, 275 F. Supp. 571 (N.D.W. Va.
1967) (five-month delay); United States v. Gladding, 265 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(four-year delay). Constitutional standards for speedy trial thus are vague and unsatisfactory, see Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 COLU!M. L. REv.
1376 (1972), and statutory requirements cure by no means all of these defects, see, e.g.,
Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (Supp. V 1975). If speedy-trial standards are inadequate, however, it is primarily because of a clash of interests as difficult
to reconcile as those present in the mistrial context itself. The speedy-trial framework
remains the appropriate context within which to resolve these problems.
216 Carsey v. United States, 392 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The first two trials
ended in hung juries, and a mistrial was declared in the third on the basis of improper
remarks by defense counsel in his closing statement. The fourth trial ended in a conviction, which was set aside when the court held the third mistrial improper.
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prosecution. Repeated trials may in fact be used as an effective
means of punishment even if a conviction never is obtained. But
even apart from these dangers, repeated trials can constitute a
severe imposition upon the accused, and mistrial decisions often
have recognized the importance of protecting the defendant
21 7
against this burden.
Neither the strain and expense suffered by the accused nor
the danger of prosecutorial harassment can be wholly controlled
by limitations upon mistrial. A prosecutor determined to make
life difficult for a defendant can produce indictments repeatedly
and require extensive pretrial defense efforts without ever raising a double jeopardy problem. 2 18 Moreover, the prosecutor can
bring the defendant to trial, time and again, on technically different charges built upon the same underlying offense. 219 And
even in the absence of governmental bad faith, the defendant
can be forced to bear the strain of repeated trials following con220
viction and reversal.
Yet the need for double jeopardy protection against the burdens of retrial remains great in view of the almost complete absence of any other workable safeguards. Deliberate governmental
misconduct may provide the basis for a general due process challenge to the prosecution, 221 but claims of this kind are very difficult
to prove, 222 and even when successful they serve only to quash the
conviction, not to redress the injury suffered from the fact of
prosecution itself. Nor can the accused obtain relief in a civil suit,
even after prosecutorial misconduct has been proved in the criminal proceedings. In most jurisdictions, prosecutors enjoy abso21 7

E.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 472 (1973) (White, J., dissenting);
United
2 1 States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 483 (1971) (Harlan, J.).
See Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a
Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 357-59 (1956). For a particularly
egregious example, see United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1954),
discussed in Comment, supra at 358 n.88. This kind of abuse theoretically might be prevented by the grand jury's power to refuse to return a true bill, but in practice the
grand jury is normally little more than a "rubber stamp." See Goldstein, The State and the
Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1169-72 (1960).
19 See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra. This power is restrained to a limited
extent by the collateral estoppel doctrine. See note 24 supra. Some states have required
the joinder of "related offenses" as a matter of state law. E.g., Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974). See generally MODEL
PENAL CODE §§ 1.07(2)-(3), .09(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); ABA STANDARDS
RELATING TO JOINDER AND SEVERANCE §§ 1.1, .3 (1968).
220 See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
221 E.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
222 See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 526 F.2d 670 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. CL
2625 (1976).
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lute immunity from damage claims of this kind, 22 3 and the same
immunity will defeat any suit against the prosecutor under the
1871 Civil Rights Act 2 24 for intentional deprivation of constitutional rights. 225 Accordingly, the burdens that retrial imposes
upon the accused and .the danger that prosecutorial action may
have been designed deliberately to impose these burdens deserve a prominent place in any calculus of the propriety of mistrial. The importance of these concerns may be relatively limited when the proceedings are aborted at a very early stage, but
they will assume great weight when a mistrial difficulty arises
after the first trial nearly has run its course.
c. Preserving a Favorable Tribunal
The mistrial decisions frequently stress the importance of
the defendant's interest in completing the trial before a tribunal
221 See, e.g., McDonald v. Lakewood Country Club, 170 Colo. 355, 461 P.2d 437
(1969) (en banc); Polidor v. Mahady, 130 Vt. 173, 287 A.2d 841 (1972). Contra, Cashen
v. Spann, 66 N.J. 541, 334 A.2d 8, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 829 (1975). As a general rule,
the municipality that employs an allegedly errant prosecutor also enjoys absolute immunity. E.g., Zimmerman v. City of New York, 52 Misc. 2d 797, 276 N.Y.S.2d 711
(Sup. Ct. 1966). Contra, Orso v. City & County of Honolulu, 56 Haw. 241, 534 P.2d 489
(1975).
224 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
225 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976); cf. Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d
830 (3d Cir. 1976) (federal prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity in suit under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1985(2), 1986 (1970)). Other forms of relief likewise may be difficult to invoke. An
injunction is a possibility if deliberate prosecutorial harassment can be proved. Compare
HMH Publishing Co. v. Garrett, 151 F. Supp. 903 (N.D. Ind. 1957), with Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Professional censure may be available in extreme cases. See
generally Lusk v. Hanrahan, 244 F. Supp. 539, 540 (E.D. Ill. 1965). Prosecutors might in
theory be subject to criminal prosecution. In practice, however, the available means for
deterring prosecutorial harassment and for compensating its victims are limited indeed.
Relief might be provided in a more straightforward and less irritating form simply
by authorizing an acquitted defendant to recover certain costs like other successful litigants. But very few states authorize this form of compensation, or provide even the
more limited remedy of financial relief for the defendant forced to undergo reprosecution after a necessary mistrial. See, e.g., United States v. Barker, 15 U.S. 186, 2 Wheat.
395 (1817); People v. Lavan, 53 Mich. App. 220, 218 N.W.2d 797 (1974). But see CoLo.
REv. STAT. § 16-18-101 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 939.06-.07 (1973); 19 PA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1221, 1223, 1230 (1964); cf. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 750 (5th
Cir. 1967) (county must reimburse individuals who have been prosecuted in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (1970) for their costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred
in defense of the state prosecutions). Compensation for the additional expense of retrial would make good sense, but it would not meet the most important objections to
mistrial. See text accompanying notes 226-40 infra. In any event, there seems to be little
likelihood of its adoption; indeed, the prevailing rules are quite the reverse, because a
convicted defendant quite commonly is compelled to pay costs. See Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d
854 (1959); cf. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974) (requirement that convicted defendants who were indigent at time of their prosecution, but who later acquired means to
pay, repay their legal defense does not violate the equal protection clause). Adding
insult to injury, these costs may include the expense of an earlier prosecution that ended
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that may be favorably disposed to his or her case.22 6 This consideration has little applicability to trials before a judge, because
frequently the same judge will be assigned to hear the case upon
reprosecution. In jury trials, however, selection of the panel can
be of great importance, and on many occasions, counsel may
have strong suspicions that the jury chosen will tend to favor the
defense, either because of past experience with jurors of similar
background or perhaps simply because the lawyer personally
"likes" the jurors. 22 7 Mistrial on such occasions will be particularly disappointing to the defense, and there may even be some
danger that the prosecution might deliberately seek to abort the
trial if it likewise regards the jury as especially favorable to the
accused.
Given the importance of the defendant's interest in preserving a potentially favorable tribunal, it is surprising that
double jeopardy doctrine is so ill-suited to protecting that interest. The settled rule is that jeopardy attaches in a jury trial
when the jury is sworn-not earlier or later. 228 This rule means
that retrial may be barred if the trial is aborted before any evidence is presented, a result that scarcely would be comprehensi-

in mistrial. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 59 F.2d 734 (S.D. Ala. 1932); Hill v. State,
21 Ala. App. 310, 107 So. 789 (1926).
226 See, e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 472-73 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 (1971) (Harlan, J.); Downum v. United
States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963).
22 See, e.g., 2 A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE
DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 340 (1971); J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, THE TRIAL OF JACK
RUBY 105 (1965). Apparently, it is becoming more common for such expectations to be
reinforced by systematic investigation of individuals included in the jury venire and by
the use of social science research to predict attitudes toward the case likely to be held by
particular social, religious, or age groups. See Okun, Investigation of Jurors by Counsel: Its
Impact on the Decisional Process, 56 GEo. L.J. 839 (1968); Kahn, PickingPeers: Social Scientists' Role in Selection ofJuries Sparks Legal Debate, Wall St.J., Aug. 12, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
218 Cases cited note 14 supra. The rule apparently is traceable to the old doctrine
that except in cases of "evident necessity" the trial judge has no authority to discharge
the jury once the case is committed to its jurisdiction, which occurs when the jury is
sworn. See note 8 supra. In cases finding no violation of the double jeopardy clause,
courts have sometimes said that jeopardy did not attach, even in midtrial, because the
mistrial was properly declared. See, e.g., Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924,
932 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949). This usage does not, of course,
affect the result, but it does promote confusion. The Supreme Court therefore has
"found it useful to define a point in criminal proceedings at which the constitutional
purposes and policies are implicated by resort to the concept of 'attachment of
jeopardy.'" Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975). The conclusion that
'Jeopardy has attached," therefore, serves only to trigger the double jeopardy analysis.
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531-32 (1975); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480
(1971) (Harlan, J.).
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ble but for the interest in preserving the first tribunal. 22 9 But the

traditional rule also means that the trial may be aborted before
the jury is formally sworn without any double jeopardy restriction whatsoever. In numerous cases, proceedings are aborted on
grounds that would not constitute "manifest necessity" after
most or all of the jurors have been selected tentatively; double
jeopardy claims are rejected on the sole ground that jeopardy
has not attached. 2 30 The prosecution therefore can avoid the

consequences of poor luck at the voir dire, as long as it thinks to
act before the jurors take their oath.
In view of this loophole, consistency would seem to require
either abandoning all effort to safeguard the defendant's interest
in a favorably disposed tribunal, or shifting the point at which
jeopardy is deemed to attach. I will consider this matter shortly,
when I turn to formulating a general framework for determining the propriety of mistrials. 23 1 For present purposes, it suffices
to note that unlike the other factors considered thus far, the
interest in a favorable tribunal-when it is present at all-arises
at the earliest stage of the trial and retains its force throughout.
In what kinds of situations, however, is this interest
genuinely present? In a great many cases, the jury may harbor
unusually strong sympathies for the accused-or for that matter,
for the prosecution. But normally no indication of such sympathies can be detected until the verdict is rendered, and frequently not even then. In such cases, termination of the trial
before verdict may deprive the defendant of a favorably disposed tribunal, but it may, for all anyone can know, relieve the
22 Indeed, before Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), some states provided
that jeopardy did not attach in either jury or nonjury cases until evidence was presented. E.g., People v. Willingham, 52 Misc. 2d 1067, 277 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
The American Law Institute similarly proposed that the presentation of evidence be
recognized as the triggering event, in order to eliminate the apparent inconsistency in
the treatment ofjury and nonjury cases. See text accompanying note 250 infra.
20 E.g., People v. Smylie, 217 Cal. App. 2d 118, 31 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1963); People v.
Scott, 40 App. Div. 2d 933, 337 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972); State v. Buck, 239 Or. 577, 398
P.2d 176 (1965); cf. Bounds v. State, 271 So. 2d 435 (Miss. 1973) (testimony had
opened without the jury being properly sworn). The Sixth Circuit recently provided a
vivid illustration of the operation of this rule. After a jury had been selected and
seated, the prosecutor discovered that certain evidence was unavailable, and a mistrial
was declared. After retrial, the court of appeals upheld a double jeopardy claim, but
the government's petition for rehearing disclosed that the first jury, though selected,
had never been sworn. This, of course, made the case altogether different; the court
vacated its earlier opinion and held retrial permissible. United States v. Whitman, 480
F.2d 1028 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1026 (1973).
231 See text accompanying notes 248-57 infra.
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accused of an unusually hostile panel and permit selection of a
better jury upon retrial. A defendant's preference for retaining
the first tribunal accordingly embodies an interest that is unusually speculative and difficult to assess. The interest should not be
simply disregarded for that reason; the perceived fairness of the
trial process depends in significant part upon the protection afforded a defendant's subjective and perhaps wholly unfounded
preference for the jury he or she has helped to select.2 3 2 But the
likelihood that mistrial in fact will force the defendant to face a
less favorable jury upon retrial normally will be too slim or imponderable to weigh heavily in the mistrial decision.
There may be unusual cases in which the defendant's interest in preserving the first tribunal will be more concrete and
compelling. The defense might be able to establish, for example,
that the social or racial background of the jurors was unusual for
the jurisdiction and that substantial grounds existed for expecting a jury of such background to be more sympathetic to the
accused than a more typically composed panel. 33 A court could
not, of course, meaningfully determine on this basis whether the
jurors were favorably disposed to the defense, and it has been
considered unseemly for judges to attempt to do so. 23 4 But in
cases of this kind, in which the defense can point to a concrete
foundation for its desire to retain the original jury, the
defendant's interest in completing the trial before the first tribunal at least would be entitled to considerably greater weight in
the double jeopardy analysis.
d. PreservingOther Prospectsfor a Favorable Outcome
If the prosecution could abort a trial whenever it was displeased with the presentation of its own case or with the strength
of the accused's defense, the possibilities for convicting a truly
innocent defendant would be increased immeasurably. Even
232See Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REv. 545,
552 (1975).
2'3Merely establishing, for example, that a black defendant faced a heavily black
jury would not be sufficient for this purpose; indeed, defense attorneys often suspect
that black, middle-class jurors may be biased against young, alienated black defendants.
See, e.g., id. 553-54 n.30 (discussing Zimroth, How They Picked the Panther 21 Jury, JUIs
DOCTOR, July-Aug. 1974, at 40). As a result, a showing of the kind suggested in the
text presumably would require establishing some substantial link between the specific
subject matter of the case and the likely attitudes of the group in question. No doubt
such a showing seldom can be made persuasively, but leaving open the possibility is
preferable to excluding from double jeopardy analysis all examination of this type of
prejudice
to the defense.
234
Id. 553-54.
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when the accused somehow is "known" to be guilty, it has been
considered fundamentally unfair to destroy the defendant's
prospects for an acquittal in the first trial solely in order to provide "the State with all its resources and power"2 3 5 a fresh opportunity to obtain a conviction.

236

The premise of these notions is far from invulnerable.
Burgeoning caseloads and constricted budgets in the prosecutor's office, combined with the expansion over the past two
decades of protection for the accused, have prompted many
observers to regard fears of an all-powerful state as largely
anachronistic. 23 7 On the other hand, relaxation of old technicalities of pleading and proof may have provided the government with advantages far more significant in operation than the
more highly publicized new safeguards for the defendant. 238 Although it is impossible to estimate with any precision the general
balance of advantage between prosecution and defense, governmental power is undoubtedly awesome when selectively employed. Indeed, the potential for abuse in any one case remains
virtually unlimited. Therefore, it is appropriate to attribute as
much importance as ever to the historic policy of redressing at
least part of the potential imbalance of resources by safeguarding any prospects for acquittal that the defendant may have
gained in the course of the first trial.
The defendant's prospects for acquittal may grow dimmer
upon retrial for a variety of reasons. First, the prosecution may
have suffered a tactical setback in the initial proceeding that it
can remedy in a retrial. Tactical setbacks often will be dramatic
and obvious-a key witness may refuse to testify, give startlingly exculpatory evidence, or retract testimony upon crossexamination. Yet often only the prosecution will be aware of its
difficulties-it may, for example, fail to elicit from one witness
proof that no other witness can supply. For the time being, the
defense may be wholly unaware that the state's case is fatally
flawed.
23'Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
236 United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (Harlan, J.); Gori v. United
States, 367 U.S. 364, 372 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Brock v. North Carolina, 344
U.S. 424, 440-42 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
237 E.g.,

PRES. COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

303-08 (1967) (additional views of Leon
Jaworski, Ross Malone, Lewis Powell, Jr. & Robert Storey); Lumbard, The Administration
of CriminalJustice: Some Problems and Their Resolution, 49 A.B.A.J. 840 (1963). The theme
is not a new one. See, e.g., United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (L.
Hand, J.).
238 Goldstein, supra note 218.
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These possibilities for tactical setback to the prosecution
suggest that nearly any mistrial could increase the likelihood of
conviction upon retrial. The danger, of course, will be minimal
in the period before evidence is taken: opening statements
rarely, if ever, will be so persuasive or so ineffective as to have an
important impact on the verdict. After testimony begins, however, the danger is ever present. Even when no prejudice to the
prosecution is apparent, double jeopardy rules must take account of the possibility that the prosecution privately entertains
serious concern for the success of its case.
Retrial may involve an increased likelihood of conviction for
a second reason, unrelated to the possibility of tactical setbacks to
the prosecution in the initial trial. The government may be aided
upon retrial merely by having observed defense counsel's tactics
on cross-examination or by having learned the nature of any
substantive defense. These possibilities are particularly important because, despite recent trends toward the liberalization of
discovery in criminal cases, the prosecution generally lacks the
opportunity to learn much prior to trial about defense tactics or
the witnesses the accused will present. 23 9 An aborted first trial
therefore provides the prosecution with general insight into defense strategy that may be useful in preparing for retrial, an
advantage frequently not offset in practice by the reciprocal
2 40
revelation of prosecution strategy to the defense.
The importance of the "discovery" advantages associated
with mistrial depends in part upon the point during the first trial
at which the proceedings are aborted. In unusual cases, the
prosecution might obtain valuable insight into defense strategy
from its opening statement, but normally no meaningful advantages can be gained before the beginning of testimony. And
discovery advantages probably remain relatively insignificant
239 See, e.g., FED. R. GRIM. P. 16(b). Relatively few states seem to allow the sweeping
discovery against the defendant recommended in ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO
DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL §§ 3.1-.3 (Tent. Draft 1969) (approved 1970).
A defendant may, however, be required to give advance notice of intention to raise an
alibi or insanity defense and to provide a list of the witnesses to be called in that connection. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1, .2; see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82, 86
(1970); Zagel & Carr, State CriminalDiscovery and the New Illinois Rules, 1971 U. ILL. L.F.
557, 637-42.
240 Although the defendant's formal discovery rights are normally as limited as are
those of the prosecution, the defense often can use the preliminary hearing and the bill
of particulars as indirect means for requiring pretrial disclosure of the government's
witnesses and trial strategy. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 129
(1969). The revelation of this kind of information at trial is therefore likely to be comparatively less significant for the defense than it will be for the prosecution.
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throughout the presentation of the government's case-in-chief.
The prosecutor may be aided by insight into general defense
tactics on cross-examination, but the knowledge concerning prosecution strategy gained by the defense ordinarily will be of
equivalent or even greater value at this stage. Discovery, therefore, will become truly significant for the government only when
the accused begins the presentation of his or her defense.
B.

When Are Double JeopardyInterests in Jeopardy?

It is scarcely possible to catalogue with precision and
economy the circumstances in which declaration of mistrial
should be considered improper. The mistrial problem has
proved intractable precisely because important factors both
favoring and opposing mistrial are almost always present simultaneously. A rather unstructured balancing approach emerges in
some of the cases as a possible response to this situation. But the
very open-endedness of the balancing approach renders it unresponsive to some of the most important considerations-the
defendant's need for reliable safeguards and the government's
interest in preventing immunization from prosecution as a result
of the unpredictable hindsight of a reviewing court.
The foregoing analysis of the underlying interests suggests a
way of avoiding this dilemma. Some of the interests traditionally
asserted should be disregarded completely in assessing the propriety of mistrial; 2 4 1 the stage of trial is a key determinant of the
importance of those interests that remain. The stage of trial thus
provides a useful guide for determining whether stringent or
more flexible safeguards will provide the suitable degree of protection for those interests. This section reviews the relative
strength of the interests implicated at each stage of the trial and
serves as the basis for an analysis of the double jeopardy
safeguards appropriate at each stage.
1. Before the Beginning of Testimony
Until testimony opens, the defendant's interest in avoiding
reprosecution ordinarily will be rather weak. The danger of prosecutorial manipulation to avoid the impact of tactical difficulties
241 These include the defendant's interest in avoiding delay, see text accompanying
notes 212-15 supra, the state's interest in promoting deference to the trial judge who
acts ostensibly for the benefit of the defense, see text accompanying notes 203-04 supra,
and the state's interest in maintaining flexibility on grounds of federalism, see text accompanying notes 205-07 supra.
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in presenting the government's case is essentially nonexistent
because presentation of the case has yet to begin. Retrial will
require some duplication of defense efforts to prepare its case
and to ready its witnesses, but the additional burden of having to
undertake a second defense will nevertheless be relatively minor
at this stage, unless selection of the jury has been unusually
difficult, time-consuming, or expensive.
The only factor of importance, indeed the one consideration
that justifies the attachment of jeopardy before testimony begins,
is the defendant's interest in presenting his or her case to a
tribunal that may be favorably disposed to the defense. This
interest is entitled to special weight, however, only in those rare
cases in which a concrete basis exists for believing that the par242
ticular jury might be unusually sympathetic to the defense.
The government's interest in reprosecuting may have particular legitimacy in the period before testimony begins. This
seems to be the time when defects in the indictment often are
discovered and failure to serve subpoenas is revealed. There is
of course no reason why such problems could not be cured before the trial begins, and good prosecutors certainly will endeavor to attend to them. But error and even incompetence are
in some measure inevitable. Whether or not their incidence
could be reduced by adding a draconian double jeopardy sanction to others that may be at work, 243 granting immunity to a
defendant in order to promote more efficient prosecutorial performance is inappropriate in the absence of danger to the
defendant's own legitimate interests.
These considerations suggest that although some protection
against mistrial is necessary before testimony begins, a relatively
flexible approach ordinarily will be appropriate because the
defendant's double jeopardy interests will be limited. More
stringent safeguards become justified, however, if the jury selection process has been unusually difficult or if the panel chosen
shows signs of being unusually favorable to the defense.
2.

From the Beginning of Testimony to the Close
of the Prosecutor's Case-in-Chief
As soon as the taking of evidence begins, mistrial involves a
radically increased potential for prejudice to the defendant.
242See text accompanying notes 282-34 supra.
243 Independent of their effect on the defendant, errors of this kind inconvenience
both the court and the prosecutor's office; professional pressure, therefore, may sanction those responsible for the errors and deter neglect.
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More time and effort are then expended, strategies of crossexamination may be revealed, and the prosecution may make
unpleasant discoveries about weaknesses in its own case. Some of
these factors, moreover, may not be readily apparent in the way
.that a lengthy voir dire might be. A tactical setback to the prosecution may occur without defense counsel's even suspecting
the problem; even if it is suspected, it may be impossible to
prove.244 Under these circumstances, mistrial exposes a defendant not only to the burden of retrial and the possible loss of a
favorably disposed tribunal, but also to the possibility that the
government will improve the strength of its case significantly in
the second prosecution.
These considerations call for particularly stringent safeguards whenever difficulty in continuing the trial is traceable to
the fault or even excusable error of the prosecution. Here the
possibility that the difficulty was caused deliberately almost always will be present. In any event, the defendant will face the
considerable burden of retrial because of an error whose consequences are more fairly placed on the party responsible for it.
The need for stringent protection is lessened considerably
when difficulty arises because of events wholly outside the control of the prosecution, such as death or illness of participants in
the trial. In such situations, the nature of the event assures that
mistrial has not been induced by a prosecutor seeking to avoid
the effects of some subtle tactical setback or hoping to gain some
other opportunity for strengthening the government's case upon
retrial. The danger remains, however, that the judge, in choosing among alternatives, may be influenced by his or her sense of
the advantages of giving the prosecutor a second chance. As a
result, stringent safeguards are necessary, at least when the
course of the first trial has produced an evident tactical advantage for the defendant.
Suppose, however, that a witness becomes ill during presentation of the prosecutor's case, and, for all that appears, none of
the testimony has proved particularly harmful to the prosecution. Do the strictest limits upon mistrial remain appropriate?
The government may have suffered a setback apparent only to
someone privy to prosecution strategy, or the prosecutor may
simply have a sense that the case has gone badly, but the prosecutor has not caused the difficulty. The judge in turn is in a
poor position to have a reliable sense of these less tangible fac244 See text accompanying notes 238-39 supra.
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tors. Under these circumstances, the possibilities for prosecutorial or judicial manipulation seem relatively remote. Retrial
does, of course, represent a significant burden for the defense,
even in the absence of specific, identifiable prejudice; some restrictions upon mistrial therefore are necessary. But the appropriate limitations should reflect the fact that in this context the
vast majority of mistrial determinations can be presumed to have
been made by trial judges in good faith.
In the period between the beginning of testimony and the
close of the prosecution's case, the strictest safeguards thus appear necessary whenever voir dire has been unusually difficult, a
concrete basis exists for considering the jury unusually favorable
to the defense, the prosecution is responsible for creating the
mistrial problem, or retrial would relieve the prosecution of
some identifiable tactical disadvantage. A more flexible approach
seems appropriate when none of these factors is present; that is,
when jury selection has not been extraordinary, when the difficulty prompting mistrial arises from causes beyond the control
of the prosecution, and when the prosecution has suffered no
apparent disadvantage during the first trial.
3.

After the Close of the Prosecutor's Case-in-Chief

Once the prosecution rests, the interests favoring declaration of mistrial over the defendant's objection become considerably weaker. At this stage, proceeding to verdict normally will
involve comparatively little inconvenience or unfair strategic disadvantage for the prosecution. If the defense decides not to
offer any evidence, the trial will in essence be over. If a defense
is offered, proceeding with the case will force the accused to
reveal his or her tactics without normally imposing an equivalent
2 45
burden on the government.
Conversely, the defendant's legitimate interests in avoiding
reprosecution become particularly strong after the government
has completed the presentation of its case-in-chief. If the defense
decides not to offer evidence, it will have largely completed its
efforts in the first trial. The frequent defense preference for a
'246
chance to "end the dispute then and there with an acquittal,
245 The strategic disadvantages of continuing the first trial conceivably might be
greater for the prosecution than for the defense if the mistrial problem happened to
arise at or near the close of the accused's defense but before the government had
begun a crucial rebuttal.
246 United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971) (Harlan, J.).

1977]

JEOPARDY AND MISTRIALS

rather than to start over from scratch, seems entitled to particular weight, because the defendant already will have borne essentially the full burden of one complete trial. If, instead, the accused intends to present evidence in defense, portions of his or
her strategy will be exposed as soon as the defense begins; a
mistrial after this point, therefore, will provide the government
with a form of discovery that can prove useful upon retrial,
regardless of whether the defense tactics were startlingly unex247
pected or effective.
Stringent limitations upon mistrial are thus appropriate in
all situations arising after the close of the prosecutor's case-inchief. Even when the first trial has produced no specific tactical
setback to the prosecution and even when there is no conceivable
possibility of governmental bad faith, either in the prosecutor's
triggering the mistrial situation or in the judge's selecting among
alternatives for resolving it, the declaration of mi.strial will
sharply increase the overall burden of defending the case and
tend to increase the prospects for conviction in ways often difficult or impossible to demonstrate.
C. A Frameworkfor Determining the Propriety of
Reprosecution After Mistrial
As the above analysis illustrates, mistrial situations arising at
each stage of the trial can be identified as involving either a
particularly acute or a relatively remote danger to the interests
traditionally protected by the double jeopardy clause. This does
not mean that mistrial can simply be prohibited in the first
group of situations and freely allowed in the second. Strong
interests clash in both contexts and discriminating analysis is
necessary. As already noted, relatively stringent. safeguards are
necessary in the first context and a more flexible approach is
appropriate in the second. The content of these two approaches
remains to be specified.
The present section considers first the problem of determining the stage of the trial at which double jeopardy analysis
should begin-that is, the stage at which jeopardy should be
deemed to "attach." It then describes a framework within which
the propriety of mistrial can be assessed when double jeopardy
principles are applicable. Subsequent sections illustrate the application of the suggested approach in the context of specific
2 47

1 See text accompanying notes 239-40 supra.
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mistrial problems and specific alternatives to the mistrial solution.
1. When Should Jeopardy Attach?
It has been considered settled that the various protections of
the double jeopardy clause commence only when the jury is
sworn or, in a nonjury trial, when the judge begins to hear
evidence. 248 This rule has deep historical roots but no remaining
basis in logic or policy. 2 49 The rule provides either too much
protection or too little, because safeguards become available in
jury trials sooner than in nonjury trials, but do not become available soon enough to protect fully against governmental action
that deprives the defense of a potentially favorable panel. The
first problem might be solved by holding that jeopardy attaches
at all trials only when testimony begins, as the American Law
Institute has proposed.2 50 But this approach would eliminate
protection, between the times the jury is sworn and testimony
opens, for the defendant's interest in retaining a panel that he or
she has helped to select. The importance of this interest amply
justifies a standard for jury trials different from that applicable
in nonjury cases. Indeed, Downum,Jorn, and Somerville all recognize the applicability of double jeopardy principles before the
25 1
opening of testimony.
The alternative solution is to make protection for the defense interest complete by holding that jeopardy attaches at an
earlier stage, the opening of voir dire providing the most convenient point of demarcation.2 5 2 Mistrial still could be declared
properly after this point, under the usual-and far from overly
248 See cases cited note 14supra.
249 See text accompanying
2-0 MODEL PENAL CODE §

notes 228-31 supra.

1.08(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The commentary

explains that "[t]here seems to be no reason to perpetuate the distinction" between the
point of attachment in jury and nonjury cases. Id. § 1.09, Comment at 53 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1956).
251 See text accompanying notes 61, 70 & 78 supra. In Jorn, the mistrial occurred
after an Internal Revenue Service agent had been called as a witness to put into evidence the allegedly fraudulent tax returns, but counsel then had stipulated to these
exhibits and they were introduced into evidence without objection. United States v.
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 472 (1971) (Harlan, J.).
252 The opening of voir dire is the moment at which the trial has been deemed
to
begin for purposes of the defendant's right to be present at trial, Hopt v. Utah, 110
U.S. 574, 578 (1884); United States v. Miller, 463 F.2d 600, 603 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 956 (1972), and for purposes of computing pretrial delay in connection with

the right to a speedy trial, COMM.

ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, GUIDELINES TO THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE "SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF

1974," at 7-8 (1975).
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rigid-standards, but there would at least be a framework within
which the defendant's interest in preserving a potentially favorable tribunal, during the period when the panel is unsworn or
only partially constituted, could be adequately weighed.2 5 3
A variety of considerations nevertheless argue against advancing the point of attachment. First, the due process clause
presumably affords protection during the voir dire period
against a mistrial deliberately induced to deprive the defendant
of a potentially favorable panel; 254 relief is thus already available, at least for the most flagrant abuses. 2 55 Second, if-as I
believe 2 5 6-double jeopardy protection ordinarily should be
rather limited in situations arising before testimony begins, extending double jeopardy protection to the period prior to the
formal swearing of the jury will not make radically more stringent safeguards applicable. The relatively minor differences in
the treatment of cases arising immediately before and immediately after the jury is sworn might therefore be considered
justified by the long history of the traditional rule, by the
symbolic significance of swearing the jury, and by the possibly
heightened anxiety and strain for the accused that may be produced by this ritual.25 7
Although the case for advancing the point of attachment is
accordingly less decisive than might at first appear, this reform
remains appropriate. Eliminating the arbitrary foreclosure of
double jeopardy inquiry and permitting meaningful functional
evaluation of the effect of mistrial are too important to be defeated by the perceived significance of the jury-swearing ritual.
Indeed, the ritual notion is largely circular because any dramatic
impact of swearing the jury may be traceable to the fact that this
is the moment at which jeopardy has been deemed to attach.
25 Normally, of course, the approximate composition of the jury cannot be predicted at the early stages of the voir dire, and so mistrial at this stage rarely would raise
serious double jeopardy problems. The attachment of jeopardy would mean only that
the question whether a tribunal favorable to the defendant had begun to take shape

could be addressed. For the approach under present law, which makes this issue irrelevant until the jury is formally sworn, see cases cited note 230 supra.
254Cf. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (sixth amendment right to
speedy trial does not apply to delays occurring prior to formal accusation by indictment
or arrest, but due process clause might require dismissal of charges, under some circumstances, if defendant can show actual prejudice resulting from preaccusation delay).
'5- On the difficulty of proving allegations of this kind, see text accompanying
notes2 321-23 infra.
'6 See text accompanying notes 258 & 261 infra.
257
. See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 389-92 (1975).
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Jeopardy therefore should be deemed to attach as soon as the
process of selecting the jury begins.
2. Resolving the Double Jeopardy Issue
As noted above, once principles of double jeopardy come
into play, the propriety of mistrial should be determined by a
relatively flexible standard when difficulties arise in two
2 58
circumstances:
(1) before the opening of testimony, provided that jury
selection has not been unusually difficult and there are no
concrete indications that the panel might be unusually
favorable to the defense; and
(2) between the opening of testimony and the close of
the government's case-in-chief, provided that the underlying
difficulty is not attributable to the prosecution, the prosecution has suffered no specific tactical setback during the
course of the trial, and jury selection has not been especially
difficult or advantageous to the defense.
On the other hand, more stringent safeguards are necessary
in three groups of situations. 25 9 These are situations in which a
trial difficulty arises:
(1) before the opening of testimony, if jury selection
has been unusually difficult or advantageous to the defense;
(2) between the beginning of testimony and the close
of the government's case, if the prosecution is responsible
for the difficulty, if the proceedings have produced a
specific tactical disadvantage for the prosecution, or if jury
selection has been especially difficult or advantageous to the
defense; and
(3) after the close of the prosecution's case, regardless
of the circumstances.
Accordingly, before passing upon the propriety of mistrial,
a trial judge will need to determine first whether the situation is
one calling for the application of a flexible standard or a relatively stringent one. Certain situations necessitating the more
stringent requirements-specifically, an exceptionally lengthy
voir dire, prosecutorial responsibility for the mistrial problem, or
termination of the government's case-in-chief-will be discerned
25s See text accompanying notes 242-44 supra.
259 See text accompanying notes 242-47 supra.
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readily. Other circumstances requiring application of a stricter
approach-a specific tactical setback to the prosecutor or a concrete basis for expectations that the panel might be unusually
favorable to the defense-will be detected less easily. As a result,
the trial judge's initial step should be to provide the defense with
an opportunity to call to the judge's attention the existence of
any facts that would make more stringent safeguards appropriate, and the judge should then make explicit findings on the
points raised as part of the initial choice of the applicable stan2 60
dard.
Many cases undoubtedly will present close questions on the
issue of tactical setback or the favorable jury, as of course mistrial cases always have. But defense counsel at least will have
focused attention on these issues from the outset. Moreover,
when the factual issues are close, the trial judge normally should
resolve any doubts in favor of the defendant, because such a
ruling will not absolutely foreclose the possibility of mistrial but
will require merely that this ultimate question be resolved by a
particularly strict set of standards. Finally, any court subsequently confronting a double jeopardy claim will be able to consider the factual issues in light of a record that is adequately
developed.
In short, the first step in any mistrial inquiry should be a
threshold determination of the question whether the interests at
stake require strict or more flexible limitations upon mistrial.
This threshold inquiry will not eliminate all sources of uncertainty in mistrial cases, but it will at least focus attention on the
relevant issues from the outset, narrow the range of doubt compared to the present unstructured standards, and provide a
more concrete indication of the way in which the presence of any
particular factor should affect the mistrial decision itself.
a. The Flexible Standard: Sound JudicialAdministration
Once the judge has determined that the mistrial situation is
not one of those in which the threat to double jeopardy interests
is particularly acute, the mistrial decision should be made in
accordance with a relatively flexible standard. The content of
260

Because Perez requires a cautious exercise of discretion at the time mistrial is

declared, failure to make an explicit record of this kind could itself constitute a double
jeopardy violation. Cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (increase of sentence after retrial invalid unless reasons for increase specified in record at time of resentencing); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (guilty plea invalid unless elements
of proper waiver spread on record when plea accepted).
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this standard remains to be specified. In the situations under
consideration, the danger of prosecutorial manipulation is remote and the possibility that the judge's mistrial determination
will be reached in bad faith is relatively slight. Nevertheless,
the burden of retrial upon the defendant, though not as severe
as in some mistrial contexts, will be significant. Accordingly,
the defendant is entitled to some protection against the burden of reprosecution, but the nature of this burden ordinarily
will not be sufficient to justify awkward or expensive alternatives to mistrial, and the trial judge normally will be in a
position to render a fair and trustworthy judgment on the need
to abort the proceedings.
These considerations suggest that the trial judge should,
first, call upon defense counsel to state the defendant's objections to mistrial. If alternatives to mistrial are proposed and the
judge sees difficulties with them, the perceived difficulties
should be explained so that the parties will have an opportunity
to eliminate them. 26 1 This sort of colloquy will take some minutes of the court's time; it may require even more if the defense
needs a reasonable period for consultation or reflection. But at
stake is the considerable time and effort already invested in the
first trial by the defendant and all the other participants. There
is accordingly no justification for a peremptory declaration of
mistrial, even under a relatively flexible standard, and retrial
should be barred if the trial judge has given the defense no
262
opportunity to state its position.
After hearing the views of the defense and considering possible alternatives, the trial judge must determine whether mistrial is appropriate. If a reasonable alternative is available, it
should not, of course, be rejected. But if a conceivable alternative involves serious disadvantages, the judge may appropriately
reject that course even if its difficulties are not altogether insuperable. The very expensive alternative of completing the first
trial was, for example, properly rejected in Somerville. The
261 The parties might agree, for example, to proceed with an 11-member jury. Or
the defendant might agree to stipulate facts that otherwise could be proved only by the
testimony of a missing prosecution witness.
262 Emergencies might arise in which it would be necessary, and therefore proper,
for the judge to take action before contacting the defense. But the judge almost always
will be able to make some effort to communicate with defense counsel before taking
irrevocable action. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Walton v. Aytch, 352 A.2d 4 (Pa.), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 178 (1976) (at 11 p.m., a sequestered juror sought permission to return
home to deal with a family emergency; discharge of the juror and resulting mistrial
held improper because the defense was not consulted).
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defendant's interests in the situations under consideration are of
constitutional dimension, but they are nonetheless sufficiently
limited that they may properly give way to what the Somerville
Court described as "some important countervailing interest of
'263
proper judicial administration.
When mistrial has been declared, a court examining a double jeopardy claim must assure itself that the defense had an
opportunity to air its views, that these views were considered, and
that the trial judge reached a reasoned decision. A trial judge
who rejects an alternative for no reason or for a patently frivolous reason will not have provided the minimal attention to double jeopardy interests that is always appropriate, and retrial
should be barred. But when the trial court renders a responsible
judgment, its decision is entitled to considerable deference. A
reviewing court should not, for example, bar retrial because it
concludes that the inconveniences of a particular alternative
were worth bearing or because it discovers a new alternative not
raised by the judge or the parties; such an approach would promote uncertainty and provide windfall immunity to defendants
in a context in which the potential for prejudice is too limited to
justify these "hindsight costs."
The foregoing standard may be described as one prohibiting retrial unless justified by considerations of "sound judicial
administration." It rejects those decisions, such as Gori, that are
inadequate to vindicate even relatively limited double jeopardy
interests. But its conception of the trial judge's duty and of the
reviewing court's role nevertheless places it rather close to the
relatively permissive tradition exemplified by the early cases and
by Somerville. This conception seems fully responsive to legitimate double jeopardy concerns in a very substantial portion of
the mistrial situations.
b.

The Stringent Standard: Strict Necessity

More stringent safeguards will be necessary, however, in the
three groups of situations involving an acute threat to double
jeopardy interests. In all of these situations, retrial involves an
unusual hardship or a great potential for tactical disadvantage to
the defense.26 4 The trial judge, of course, should allow defense
counsel to argue the mistrial question just as in cases involving
'63 Illinois
2 64

v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973).
See text accompanying notes 242-47 supra.
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less serious possibilities for prejudice. But because the defendant's interests in avoiding reprosecution are now particularly
strong, the judge cannot appropriately reject an alternative to
retrial merely because it appears clumsy or inefficient or because
it would interfere with an "important countervailing interest."
Alternatives should be pursued unless they present truly compelling difficulties.
The dangers of retrial seem so great in this context that the
question may fairly be raised whether mistrial is improper even
if no alternatives are available. In considering this question, a
distinction must be drawn between mistrial difficulties occasioned by events beyond governmental control and those difficulties attributable to the prosecutor or the judge. In the
former case, the extraneous nature of the precipitating event
provides assurance that harassment is not involved. The chief
potential for manipulation arises from the danger that the judge
may not seek alternatives in good faith once a pretext for mistrial presents itself, and even this problem is absent if alternatives to mistrial are truly unavailable. Although the burden upon
the defendant remains severe, these situations, which would include cases of military necessity or irrevocably deadlocked juries,
are ones in which "the public's interest in fair trials designed to
end in just judgments '26 5 always has been held to take precedence. Thus, mistrial should be appropriate when difficulties are
caused by an event beyond governmental control and when no
alternative solution is available.
When the judge or the prosecutor is at fault in creating the
initial difficulty, however-as when witnesses are not subpoenaed or their willingness to testify is not properly assured-the
potential for harassment is nearly always acute. Because reprosecution necessarily subjects the defendant to severe inconvenience in any of the situations requiring application of the
stringent standard, a rule permitting mistrial in the event of
governmental error could become a source of serious abuse.
Apart from the danger of harassment, fairness would seem to
require that the government bear the consequences of its error,
rather than impose a particularly heavy burden on the defendant and gain a fresh start for itself as an added reward. Accordingly, where the prosecutor or the judge is responsible for a
mistrial difficulty arising in situations calling for strict safe205 Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
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guards, retrial normally should be barred even if alternatives are
unavailable. 6 6
Just as the trial judge must closely scrutinize the need for
mistrial in situations in which stringent safeguards are appropriate, a court subsequently confronting a double jeopardy claim
in such cases should subject any mistrial order to searching review. Close scrutiny does involve the danger that retrial may be
barred even when the trial judge made a scrupulous effort to
render a fair judgment. But the costs of hindsight are fully justified in this context. Meaningful review is necessary to prevent
abuse at the trial level, and, above all, immunity from reprosecution cannot be considered a mere windfall because retrial in this
context always involves a danger of substantial prejudice to the
defendant.
The second standard may be described as one prohibiting
retrial unless the mistrial was justified by "strict necessity." The
approach is closely akin to that mapped out in Downum andJorn,
but it is confined to a much narrower range of situations, excluding, for example, the facts of both of those cases.2 67
Neither the standard of sound judicial administration nor
the standard of strict necessity produces an automatic answer to
most mistrial problems: the two standards scarcely could be responsive to the relevant interests if they did. Rather, each provides a framework within which a wide range of factors must be
examined and judgment exercised. For this reason, it does not
seem overly troublesome that some problems that might arise
after the prosecution rests could turn out to be less in need of
the strict approach than others arising before this point of demarcation. The two standards provide guidelines sufficiently
specific that choice between them normally will and should affect
the result, but both permit an appropriate recognition of the
circumstances of the exceptional case.
D. ParticularMistrialSituations
The application of the two standards may be illustrated
briefly by considering some of the mistrial situations that have
proved particularly troublesome to the courts.
266 For recent decisions in agreement with this requirement that retrial be barred
even in the absence of alternatives, see cases cited in notes 125-27, 157 supra & accompanying text.
267 In both Downum and Jorn, mistrial was declared before the opening of testimony, see text accompanying notes 61 & 70 supra, and there was no indication that
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1. Formal Defects in the Institution of the Proceedings
Defects in the indictment frequently are discovered before
any testimony has been taken. Somerville, for example, was a case
of this kind. In these situations, as long as jury selection has not
been unusually difficult and has not produced a panel unusually
favorable to the defense, the propriety of mistrial should be
judged by considerations of sound judicial administration. Pursuant to this standard, alternatives must of course be considered,
but they may be rejected if they involve significant inconvenience
or expense. Mistrial was therefore proper in Somerville itself.
Courts often hold mistrial improper if they find the procedural defect to be "insubstantial. 2 6 8 This result is inappropriate when the relatively flexible principles of sound judicial
administration are applicable. If the trial judge has made a conscientious effort to resolve a genuine difficulty, reprosecution
should not be barred merely because the court considering the
double jeopardy claim would have resolved the matter differently in the first instance. Cases holding that retrial is permissible
when a "reasonable but erroneous belief" prompts the judge to
declare a mistrial26 9 therefore reflect the sounder approach in
situations in which the danger of prejudice to the defendant is
remote.
A stricter approach is necessary, even before the opening of
testimony, in those rare cases in which special circumstances indicate that the jury might be unusually favorable to the defense.
Under the standard of strict necessity, alternatives must be pursued unless they present compelling problems, and if the
prosecution is responsible for the underlying difficulty, retrial
will be barred even when no alternatives are available. This may
seem a draconian sanction for technical difficulties arising so
early in the trial, but in fact a workable alternative almost always
will be available; the original jurors may, for example, be reimpaneled after defects in the indictment are cured.2 7 ° If alternajury selection had been unusually difficult or unusually advantageous to the defense.
The standard of "strict necessity," therefore, would not have been applicable. See text
accompanying note 258 supra. For an analysis of the Downum and Jorn facts in terms of
the proposed standards, see text accompanying notes 273-75 infra.
268 See note 104 supra & accompanying text.
26 9
' E.g., United States v. Sedgwick, 345 A.2d 465, 472 (D.C. 1975), cert. denied,

425 U.S. 966 (1976).
270 This procedure, though technically involving a reprosecution, fully protects the
defendant's interest in presenting his or her case to the original tribunal; the approach
is thus functionally equivalent to a continuance rather than a mistrial. For cases employ-
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tives are truly unavailable, it is not unfair to require the prosecution to bear the burden of its error in this limited situation involving a concrete danger of prejudice to the defendant.
The same is true a fortiori when formal defects in the institution of the proceedings are discovered after testimony has
begun. The very strict rule recently announced by the California
Supreme Court, 27 1 barring retrial whenever the judge or the
prosecutor is responsible for such defects, is not normally appropriate for situations arising before evidence is taken. But the
result was proper on the facts of the case before the court because testimony had been heard for a full day at the first trial.
2. Unavailability of Prosecution Witnesses
Witnesses may prove to be unavailable because of prosecutorial error or because of events wholly beyond governmental control. Many decisions bar retrial without regard to prosecutorial fault, the stage of the proceedings, and sometimes even
2 72
the availability of alternatives.
This stringent approach is normally inappropriate when the
difficulty is discovered before testimony has begun. Both Downum and Jon were cases of this kind. In Downum, the prosecution bore responsibility for allowing the jurors to be selected
when a key witness had not been served, but there was no indication that the jury selected would offer any special advantage to
the defense. Retrial therefore presented little danger to double
jeopardy interests, and the propriety of mistrial should have
been judged by considerations of sound judicial administration.
Because all available alternatives involved significant drawbacks,2 73 mistrial was an appropriate solution. The Downum opinion provided a valuable caveat concerning the dangers of the
permissive approach that had prevailed until that time, but its
ing the device of reimpaneling the original jury, see, for example, Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916); People v. Cobb, 19 Il1. App. 3d 520, 311 N.E.2d 702 (1974).
The principal disadvantage associated with this approach is that the jurors could be
subjected to prejudicial publicity or even to pressure by the parties during the interval
before resumption of the proceedings. This cannot, however, be considered a compelling problem because, at worst, a juror could be disqualified if and when such a difficulty arose.
271 People v. Upshaw, 13 Cal. 3d 29, 528 P.2d 756, 117 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1974),
discussed in note 102 supra.
2172See notes 124-32 supra & accompanying text.
273 372 U.S. at 742-43 (Clark, J., dissenting). The Court made no effort to minimize
the difficulties emphasized in the dissenting opinion. See note 69 supra. If these supposed difficulties had been without substance, mistrial would have been improper, and
the result in Downum would have been correct.
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analysis was misapplied in the circumstances actually presented.
The Supreme Court might therefore reverse the frequent practice of disregarding the language of a troublesome precedent
and treating it as limited to its facts. The language of Downum
remains useful, but its holding does not. Downum should be
overruled.
Jorn stands on somewhat firmer ground. There the judge
refused to let certain witnesses testify because he believed that
they were unaware of their constitutional rights. This occurred
before any testimony had been presented. 2 74 Thus, the propriety
of mistrial should have been judged by a relatively flexible standard. The trial judge, however, gave defense counsel no opportunity to argue the mistrial question, to suggest alternatives, or to
point out factors associated with the selection of the jury that
might have required caution before discharging it. Therefore,
the minimal requirements of sound judicial administration had
not been satisfied, and the Supreme Court properly held retrial
to be barred. If the trial judge had considered alternatives but
had found a reasonable basis for rejecting them, mistrial would
have been proper, notwithstanding intimations in the plurality
opinion that such a determination might not have withstood
27 5
review.
3.

Inability of the Jury To Agree upon a Verdict

The courts differ radically in their approach to the hungjury problem in cases in which the defendant has opposed the
2 76
jury's discharge or has had no opportunity to question it.
Some courts subject the deadlock determination to the most
rigorous scrutiny, while others-apparently the majority-leave
the matter almost wholly to the discretion of the trial judge. The
prevailing view gives inadequate weight to the fact that the problem of jury deadlock arises not merely after the close of the
prosecutor's case-in-chief, but after complete presentation of all
defense and rebuttal evidence. Mistrial at this late stage of the
2 77
case involves acute possibilities for prejudice to the defendant.
Indeed, in some cases the judge's diligence in seeking a verdict
could be affected by his or her sense of how well the trial has
2174See

note 251 supra.

400 U.S. at 485-86.
276 See text accompanying notes 168-85 supra.
277 See text accompanying notes 245-47 supra.
275
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gone for the prosecution. The need for mistrial therefore should
be tested by the strict necessity standard.
This does not, of course, imply that the trial court should
coerce the jury into a verdict by any available means. Refusal to
discharge the jury after repeated claims of deadlock and fatigue
is not required in order to provide meaningful double jeopardy
protection; nor are coercive instructions required, such as the
generally disfavored Allen charge. 8 On the other hand, there is
no justification for a judge peremptorily to discharge a jury
without consulting defense counsel and without establishing unqualified evidence of deadlock for the record. When the defendant urges continued deliberations, with or without other techniques for producing agreement, the judge must remain free to
reject suggestions that would be overly coercive. But when the
judge is unable to find that suggested means of ending deadlock
would be coercive, the defendant's constitutionally protected
interest in "end[ing] the dispute then and there with an acquittal" 2 79 is entitled to preference.
The dangers presented by mistrial in this context similarly
justify searching review of the record upon which a deadlock
determination rests. Thus, reprosecution should be barred even
when a court considering a double jeopardy claim holds inadequate a finding that may have been reached by a trial judge in
the best of faith. But such situations will be infrequent, at least in
the case of trial judges who understand the need for the utmost
caution in discharging a possibly hung jury. And the hindsight
problem in any event is entitled to rather little weight in the jury
deadlock situation. The only defendants who would be immunized from reprosecution are those who have made a full
presentation of their defense and therefore face a particularly
great potential for prejudice as a result of retrial. Moreover, the
law enforcement costs of sustaining the double jeopardy claim
are particularly weak because the defendants in question will be
278 The charge states in part that "if much the larger number were for conviction, a
dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made
no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with
himself." Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896). This instruction, which has
been viewed as pressuring the jurors in the minority to accede to the majority's view,
was upheld by the Supreme Court in Allen, but has been the subject of extensive criticism, see, e.g., ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4(b), at 151 (1968). The
Allen charge has now been disapproved in many states. E.g., Commonwealth v. Spencer,
422 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299 (1971).
279 United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971) (Harlan, J.).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 125:449

the ones whose possible guilt
provoked substantial debate among
280
members of the first jury.
The Third Circuit's decisions in Russo and Webb, 28 1 which
departed from the prevailing view by examining closely the basis
for the jury-deadlock determination, therefore reflect a more
suitable approach to the hung-jury problem. This approach
should not result in undue pressure upon the jury or in measures compromising the integrity of the unanimous verdict, but
it will provide the stringent protection for double jeopardy interests that is appropriate in this context.
E. ParticularAlternatives to Mistrial
The viability of alternatives to mistrial in any particular case
is crucial in deciding whether mistrial is justified by considerations of sound judicial administration or strict necessity. 2 82 It
would be hazardous to suggest rules for determining the viability
of alternatives in advance because alternatives to mistrial are as
various as the myriad problems to which they must respond, and
because the relative importance of any obstacle to pursuing an
alternative necessarily depends upon the strength of the countervailing interests against mistrial in a particular case. Three
kinds of alternatives, however, do present questions of sufficient
generality to justify separate treatment here.
1. The Eleven-Member Jury
When a juror becomes ill, is disqualified, or is unable to
serve for other reasons, and when no alternate juror is
280 Indeed, it has been argued that on this ground reprosecution should be impermissible even after a genuinely hung jury. Silverstein, Double Jeopardy and Hung Juries:
United States v. Castellanos, 5 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 218, 226-29 (1974). The notion
seems to be that a hung jury necessarily establishes a reasonable doubt concerning the
defendant's guilt. This need not be the case, however, because a hung jury may indicate
only that all the jurors consider the defendant "probably" guilty and one juror entertains a doubt that the 11 others consider unreasonable. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356, 362-63 (1972). Moreover, barring reprosecution after a hung jury probably
would create irresistible pressure for abolition of the unanimity requirement, a step that
is now permissible at least in the state courts. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
As long as the deadlock is genuine, therefore, the decisions tend to uphold reprosecution
even after several hung juries. See, e.g., United States v. Corbitt, 497 F.2d 922 (3d Cir.
1974), aff'g mem. 368 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (third trial permissible after two
hung juries); United States v. Castellanos, 478 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1973) (third trial permissible after two hung juries); United States v. Persico, 425 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970) (fifth trial permissible after two hung juries and two reversals of convictions). But see Preston v. Blackledge, 332 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.N.C. 1971)
(fifth trial barred after four hung juries).
281 For a discussion of Russo and Webb, see text accompanying notes 175-82 supra.
282 See text accompanying notes 261-66 supra.
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available,2 8 3 the trial court must decide whether it is permissible
to continue the trial with a reduced panel. Statutes or rules of
procedure fix the size of a complete jury, usually at twelve.28 4
Upon the incapacitation of a juror, the defense might invoke
such provisions and object to the reduced panel. If the defense
does object, it may then affirmatively seek mistrial, but even if
the defense objects both to reduction of the panel and to mistrial, the accused cannot reasonably base double jeopardy objections upon the trial judge's failure to pursue an alternative that
the defense itself rejected.
The more troubling situation occurs when the defendant
prefers to continue the trial with a reduced panel, but the
285
prosecution demands a mistrial. In Singer v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that a defendant has no constitutional
right to waive a trial by jury, explaining that "the Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in seeing that cases
...are tried before the tribunal which the Constitution regards
as most likely to produce a fair result. '286 The Court declined to
elaborate on the nature of this interest and even held that the
prosecution need not articulate its reasons for demanding a jury
trial. Applying the same principle to the more limited question
whether the prosecution may demand a jury of a particular size,
most courts have upheld mistrial when the prosecution objects to
28 7
the alternative of an eleven-member panel.
282 Alternate jurors are not selected in all cases, and most jurisdictions require that
alternates be discharged when the jury retires for deliberations. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P.
24(c); see United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1972); 2 C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 388, at 52-53 (1969); ABA STANDARDS RELATING
TO TRIAL
BY JURY § 2.7, at 81-83 (1968).
28 4
E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b).
285 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
28
6 Id. at 36.
287 For a discussion of recent lower court decisions to this effect, see notes 111-12,
122 supra & accompanying text. Contra, Hutchens v. District Court, 423 P.2d 474 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1967). See also United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 584 (1941); Gardes v. United States, 87 F. 172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 171 U.S.
689 (1898).
The federal decisions appear to be based in part on the language of FED. R. CRINI.
P. 23(b), which provides that "[j]uries shall be of 12 but at any time before verdict the
parties may stipulate in writing with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist
of any number less than 12." Although Singer interpreted analogous language in rule
23(a) as granting the government a virtually unqualified prerogative to withhold its
consent to a waiver of jury trial, Singer is inapplicable to the problem presented by
waiver of a jury of particular size. See text accompanying notes 290-93 infra. The courts
therefore remain free to adopt a construction of rule 23(b) more consonant with double
jeopardy policies by interpreting the rule to require that, when necessary to avoid mistrial, the prosecutor's stipulation to a panel of less than 12 shall not be unreasonably
withheld. Under such an interpretation, the government could be called upon to articu-
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This rule poses a serious threat to double jeopardy interests,
as the recent decision in United States v. Means 2 88 illustrates.
The defendants, leaders of the American Indian Movement,
were prosecuted on numerous charges arising out of disorders at
Wounded Knee, South Dakota. After an eight-and-a-half-month
trial, the jury retired to deliberate, but one of the jurors became
ill and had to be excused. The defendants agreed to accept the
verdict of the remaining eleven jurors, but the prosecutor refused, explaining to the press that he thought the chances for
conviction were slim. 289 The prosecutor therefore sought a mistrial, and the judge apparently did not believe that he had the
power to proceed over the prosecutor's objections to the reduced
panel. The judge ultimately dismissed the indictment with
prejudice because of prosecutorial misconduct unrelated to the
eleven-member jury question. But the prosecutor's action in relation to that question demonstrates that a rule granting the prosecution broad power to foreclose the alternative of a reduced
panel invites manipulation and harassment, and exposes defendants to the potentially severe burden of a second, long trial,
regardless of whether the government's interest in a complete
jury of twelve is a substantial one in the particular case.
What, in fact, is the nature of the prosecution's interest in a
panel of twelve? Singer failed to explain why the government
might properly object to dispensing with the jury altogether, but
the principal factors appear to be a concern that a judge might
be unduly favorable to the defense in certain kinds of cases, a
concern that a jury verdict may be necessary to legitimate severe
sanctions in cases of the most serious felonies, and a concern for
establishing reciprocity in the tactical options available to the
prosecution and the defense. 290 Reducing the panel from twelve
to eleven, however, scarcely affects these interests. The verdict is
still rendered by independent citizens, and the panel remains
sufficiently large to provide solemnity and force to its verdict.
Indeed, although courts in many early cases insisted that
late its objections to a reduced panel, and the court could weigh these objections against
the burden that would result from mistrial. If rule 23(b) were not so construed, its
application might, under some circumstances, violate the double jeopardy clause. See
text accompanying notes 303-08 infra.
288 513 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1975).
289 See United States v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 389, 397 (D.S.D. 1974), appeal dismissed
sub nom.
United States v. Means, 513 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1975).
2
' See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY §§ 1, 2(a), Commentary at
30-32 (1968).
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"[t]welve is the magic number," 29 ' the Supreme Court, in holding that the sixth amendment right to trial by jury does not
guarantee a panel of any particular size, found "little reason to
think that [the goals of jury trial] are in any meaningful sense
less likely to be achieved when the jury numbers six, than when it
numbers 12 .... 292
Nor does reciprocity justify honoring the prosecution's objections to a jury of eleven. Because a defendant undoubtedly
will insist upon a panel of twelve when doing so is tactically
advantageous,2 9 3 the prosecutor may feel entitled to the same
privilege. But the double jeopardy clause by its nature condemns
this claim to reciprocity. No matter how many times a defendant
is convicted, he or she may always receive another trial if the
prior proceedings were unfair. But a single acquittal, no matter
how tainted by error, precludes retrial; even before acquittal, the
proceedings may never be aborted, once jeopardy has attached,
simply because the government's prospects seem dim.
Prosecution objections to an eleven-member jury, therefore,
seldom will have a legitimate basis, and in most instances this
alternative should not be rejected even under the more flexible
standard for passing upon mistrial. A conceivable exception
might be, for example, the disqualification of the only woman
juror in a rape case in which the defense is based on consent. In
such a situation, the court might consider the concern for a
balanced panel to be an important, or even compelling, interest.
Normally, however, the prosecution should not be able to force a
mistrial by refusing to accept an eleven-member jury.
291 United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 871 (4th Cir. 1964); see
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343,
350 (1898).
292 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (emphasis supplied). The Court
concluded, "[T]he fact that the jury at common law was composed of precisely 12 is a
historical accident, unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury system and wholly
without significance 'except to mystics.'" Id. at 102 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 182 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). In light of Williams, the language of
Singer appears inapplicable to the question of governmental consent to changes in jury

size, because a 12-member jury is not, in the language of Singer, "the tribunal which the
Constitution regards as the most likely to produce a fair result." Singer v. United States,

380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965). The 12-member jury nevertheless remains the preferred tribunal under the Federal Rules. See FED. R. CRaIN. P. 23(b).
293 A state need not, of course, honor such a demand. Because Williams allows cases
to be tried by a jury of less than 12, a defendant presumably would have no constitutional basis for an objection to a rule requiring that trials begin with 12 jurors but
allowing a verdict to be rendered by a lesser number, even without the defendant's
consent, if a juror is unable to continue.
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2. Severance in Joint Trials
The question whether the trial court should sever a prosecution against multiple defendants rather than declare a mistrial
for all the defendants has been highly problematical. Indeed,
even outside of the mistrial context, joinder of defendants presents difficult and controversial problems:
The traditional rationale for joinder ... is that of conserving... the efforts of the prosecuting attorney, and
possibly his witnesses, and of judges and court officials.
Severance, on the other hand, is typically sought on the
ground that a unified disposition ... would put those
proceeded against at an unfair disadvantage, due to
confusion of law and evidence by the trier of the fact
and the "smear" effect such confusion can produce.2 9 4
Prevailing standards for reconciling these competing claims are
vague and perhaps unsatisfactory,2 9 5 but for present purposes
we need not examine the question whether a joint prosecution
should be allowed at the outset of a trial. Our concern rather is
with the question whether the interests that initially may have
justified joinder lose their force when a mistrial problem arises
in the course of a joint trial. For example, once the case has been
submitted to the trier of fact, a denial of severance will not save
government resources in the first trial and almost always will
make reprosecution more time-consuming than if retrial were
confined to only one of the original defendants. 29 6 The same
often will be true when mistrial is declared after the close of the
prosecution's case-in-chief. 29 7 In these situations, the government's legitimate interest in preserving the joinder for the
sake of efficiency is outweighed substantially by the prejudicial
effects of joinder upon the defense. Indeed, these effects may
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO JOINDER AND SEVERANCE 1 (1968).
295 See id. § 1.2, at 13-17.
296 One justification for joinder that might still be applicable in some situations is
294

that a joint trial "may be essential to an understanding of the entire [conspiracy] operation and the role played by each participant." MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(4), Comment

at 135 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). As a general rationale for joinder, however, this
claim is a dubious one. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO JOINDER AND SEVERANCE
15-17 (1968). In any event, once the trial of one defendant has been completed, the

rules of evidence normally should pose no barrier to presenting in a separate trial pertinent testimony concerning the role of another defendant.
297 The government might be forced to duplicate its rebuttal testimony in some

situations, but this duplication of effort normally would be relatively minor compared
to the additional effort that would be required to present the case-in-chief a second
time against both defendants.
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represent the real basis for a prosecutor's resistance to severance.
Several cases suggest that it might be improper to deny
severance merely for the convenience of the prosecution, but
that fairness to all the defendants may require preserving the
joinder. 298 These decisions appear to rest on the theory that if
severance is followed by conviction of the first group of defendants, the second jury may be prejudiced by knowledge of the
outcome of the first case. This rationale, however, is applicable
only in cases attracting unusual public attention, and, even then,
the interests of the second group of defendants normally could
be protected adequately by the usual remedies for pretrial
publicity-continuance, careful probing of prospective jurors on
2 99
voir dire, or change of venue.

The justifications for denying severance are thus much
weaker in some situations than in others, but the decisions do
not reflect adequately the corresponding need for a discriminating approach. Although the federal courts of appeals are split on
the question whether severance should be ordered to avoid mistrial, the decisions disregard the interests at stake in each case
and instead appear to adopt a per se rule. A Fourth Circuit
decision, for example, holds flatly that severance need not be
considered, and a Sixth Circuit case reaches the opposite
conclusion. 0
A close look at the facts of the two cases suggests that probably both were wrongly decided. The Sixth Circuit decision in
Thomas v. Beasley3 ' involved a Tennessee robbery prosecution.
The trial court had declared a mistrial when it was discovered
during the testimony of the first witness that counsel for two of
298 United States v. Smith, 390 F.2d 420, 422-24 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Chase, 372 F.2d 453, 465-66 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967).
299 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1976); Sheppard v.

Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966). Even in the rare situation in which the defendant who must in any event be retried faces a serious danger of publicity impairing the
constitutional right to a fair trial, it is far from clear that this danger can justify a
restriction of the double jeopardy rights of a third party. Cf. Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 96 S. Ct. at 2803-04 (defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial does not
take precedence over first amendment rights of a third party).
300
See text accompanying notes 158-59 & 161-63 supra. For a leading pre-Somerville
case requiring severance, see People v. Davis, 29 Mich. App. 443, 185 N.W.2d 609
(1971). Contra, United States v. lacovetti, 466 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 908 (1973); Oelke v. United States, 389 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1029 (1968); cases cited in note 298 supra. See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 280.10(2)
(McKinney 1971).
a' 491 F.2d 507 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 955 (1974).
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Beasley's codefendants had a conflict of interest requiring that
they be excused. The Sixth Circuit held that severance should
have been ordered and the trial of Beasley completed. But here
the difficulty had arisen early in the proceedings, the government was not responsible for it, and there was no indication that
Beasley had gained unexpected tactical advantages in the first
trial. Under these circumstances, the propriety of mistrial should
have been judged by the relatively flexible considerations of
sound judicial administration, and the trial judge's rejection of
the severance alternative should have been upheld if that alternative interfered with an important countervailing interest.
Because the state was in the early stages of presenting its case,
its interest in maintaining the joinder was substantial, and the
mistrial for all defendants, including Beasley, should have been
held permissible.
In the Fourth Circuit case of Whitfield v. Warden,"0 2 a juror
was exposed to prejudicial influence after completion of the
state's case-in-chief. Whitfield was willing to proceed with the
alternate juror, but his codefendant Baker refused, and mistrial
was declared with respect to both. The Fourth Circuit upheld
the mistrial, ruling that severance was not an appropriate alternative. But because the difficulty here arose after the prosecution had rested, mistrial should have been allowed only in a case
of strict necessity; severance therefore should have been required unless it would have interfered with a truly compelling
interest. And no such interest was implicated-because the state
had completed presentation of its case-in-chief, more effort
likely was necessary to retry both defendants than would have
been required to complete the first trial and retry Baker alone.
Mistrial therefore should have been held improper with respect
to Whitfield.
Cases like Whitfield and Beasley illustrate the inappropriateness of a per se rule concerning the need for severance. When
double jeopardy policies are acutely implicated, the advantages
of joinder seldom will amount to the compelling interest required to override the defendant's interest against retrial; but
when the danger to double jeopardy interests is remote, joinder
in the particular case may involve advantages sufficiently significant to justify mistrial with respect to all the defendants.
302 486 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974), discussed in text
accompanying notes 158-59 supra.
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3. Alternatives Unavailable Under State Law
In some jurisdictions, minor defects in an indictment may
not be curable by amendment, even with the defendant's
consent; 30 3 illness of a trial judge may not be surmountable by
assigning a replacement; 30 4 and the solution to a variety of other
mistrial problems may be impeded because certain alternatives
are foreclosed under state practice. The Supreme Court has not
always been sensitive to the danger such rules of local procedure
may present to double jeopardy interests. 5 In his Somerville
dissent, Mr. Justice Marshall sought to remedy this defect by
focusing directly upon the importance of the interests supporting the state's rule against amending the indictment. He found
these interests less weighty than the defendant's interests against
mistrial and accordingly argued that the state should be required
either to abandon its own rule or to forego reprosecution of the
defendant.
The kind of analysis proposed by Mr. Justice Marshall opens
up a virtually unlimited range of alternatives and necessitates
inquiry into the weight to be attributed to a variety of state
policies. An analysis of such sweep may be useful in situations
requiring application of the strict necessity standard, but it seems
inappropriate in cases that should be governed by the more flexible standard, such as Somerville itself. In Somerville, the difficulty
arose before testimony had begun, and the composition of the
first jury did not appear to offer the defendant any special advantage. The danger to double jeopardy interests was therefore
remote, and the defendant could have been protected adequately by a requirement that the trial judge explore alternatives
to mistrial in good faith. Because the alternative of amending the
indictment at trial was prohibited by state law, the judge's fairness in rejecting this alternative cannot be doubted. It thus
should be improper to question the validity of state procedures
excluding a particular alternative in cases, like Somerville, that
involve only a remote danger to double jeopardy interests.
The analysis should change, however, in cases involving a
greater threat to double jeopardy interests. Suppose, for example, that in Somerville the defect in the indictment had not been
303See, e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); State v. Brooks, 224 Tenn.
712, 462 S.W.2d 491 (1970), cert. dismissed, 405 U.S. 127 (1972).
3'4 See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 4.3, Commentary at 100-02
(1968).
305 See note 207 supra.
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discovered until testimony had been completed and the jury was
about to retire for deliberations,3 0 6 or that state or federal rules
were held to foreclose the possibility of proceeding with an
eleven-member jury, even after a protracted trial.30 7 Mistrial
under such circumstances presents a danger of severe prejudice
to the defendant, independent of the possibility of bad-faith
conduct by the judge or the prosecutor, and thus evenhanded
evaluation of alternatives by the judge may fail to protect the
defendant from abuse. In these situations, mistrial is justified
only by strict necessity, and no alternative should be rejected
unless the difficulties associated with pursuing it are severe. The
fact that a state has decided to prohibit a particular procedure
should, of course, be entitled to great weight in making this
determination. But a court should look behind the state rule and
carefully evaluate its importance, before concluding that an al308
ternative is unavailable for double jeopardy purposes.
F. Consent by the Defendant to Mistrial
My concern until now has centered on the scope of the
accused's right to prevent the- declaration of mistrial, in situations in which such a ruling may be antithetical to defense interests. I will now consider the effect of action by the defendant
affirmatively seeking mistrial. The Supreme Court has often
stated that a defense motion for mistrial ordinarily will remove
any barrier to reprosecution.3 0 9 This rule is easy enough to understand when events wholly beyond governmental control trigger the mistrial motion. Suppose, for example, that after a juror
dies, the trial judge proposes to continue the trial with the remaining jurors, but the defendant moves for a mistrial. Mistrial
is certainly not "necessary," but if the judge follows the course
306 See, e.g., State v. Russo, 70 Wis. 2d 169, 233 N.W.2d 485 (1975), discussed in text
accompanying note 103 supra.
307 See, e.g., United States v. Means, 513 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1975), discussed in text
accompanying notes 288-89 supra.
308 Though a procedural alternative may be considered available for purposes of
the double jeopardy inquiry, a trial judge presumably could not invoke that alternative
if it were prohibited by state law. The double jeopardy clause would not force upon the
state a procedure it had determined to reject but merely would bar reprosecution of the
defendant in these special circumstances presenting a serious threat to legitimate double
jeopardy interests. Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (existence of adequate and independent state law ground sustaining conviction does not necessarily prevent examination of underlying constitutional claim by federal court on habeas corpus).
30 9 E.g., United States v. Dinitz, 96 S. Ct. 1075, 1079-80 (1976); United States v.
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971) (dictum); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 467
(1964).
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preferred by the defense, it is difficult to perceive any danger to
double jeopardy concerns.
The rule becomes somewhat more troublesome, however,
when the need for mistrial is attributable to error or misconduct
by the prosecutor or the judge. Although here too the defense
may be granted complete freedom to choose between the burden
of a second trial and the possible disadvantages of continuing the
first, its preference for mistrial cannot be considered wholly voluntary if the government was responsible for creating its dilemma in the first place. Nevertheless, Supreme Court decisions
hold that a defendant may be reprosecuted under these circumstances.
United States v. Tateo 310 provides a striking illustration of this
point. Midway through Tateo's trial, the trial judge told the defense counsel that he planned to impose the maximum sentence
if Tateo was convicted by the jury. Tateo promptly decided to
plead guilty. The plea was later set aside as coerced, but Mr.
Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, held that reprosecution
was not barred. Without discussing the problem of voluntariness,
the Court simply asserted that under the circumstances a mistrial
motion by Tateo would have removed any objection to retrial
and that his position could be no stronger when instead he had
agreed to terminate the proceedings with a conviction. 3 11 In his
subsequent opinion inJorn, Mr. Justice Harlan made explicit the
implications of Tateo by stating that "the question of 'voluntariness' for purposes of assessing the validity of a plea of guilty...
must be distinguished from the question of 'voluntariness' for
purposes of assessing reprosecutability under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. '3 12 Regrettably, neither Tateo norJorn explains
why these two questions are distinguishable or when, apart from
situations in which prosecutorial or judicial impropriety is specifically intended to prevent an acquittal, 31 3 a mistrial motion
would be rendered involuntary for double jeopardy purposes.
The Court's recent decision in United States v. Dinitz31 4 sheds
much-needed light on the problem. Dinitz' principal counsel
had made a number of improper comments in his opening
statement. When the judge's repeated admonitions proved un310
377
3 11

U.S. 463 (1964).

Id. at 467-68.
"12400 U.S. at 485 n.l1.
3 13
See id. at 485 n.12.
314 96 S. Ct. 1075.(1976).
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availing, he excluded the lawyer from the trial and offered Dinitz the option of having co-counsel proceed with the trial, obtaining a recess until the court of appeals could rule on the
propriety of the exclusion order, or moving for a mistrial. Dinitz
moved for a mistrial, but after his retrial and conviction, the
Fifth Circuit held that the second trial had subjected him to
double jeopardy. The panel's opinion, upheld by an eight-toseven majority of the circuit en banc, concluded that the trial
judge had "overreacted" by issuing the exclusion order; by failing to examine alternative ways to discipline the attorney, the
judge had confronted the defendant with a "Hobson's choice,"
and the decision to move for a mistrial in these circumstances
therefore did not represent a valid "waiver" of Dinitz' right to
3 15
present his case to the first jury.
The Supreme Court rejected this approach and held retrial
proper. Writing for six members of the Court, 3 16 Mr. Justice
Stewart reasoned that in mistrial situations:
the defendant generally does face a "Hobson's choice"
between giving up his first jury and continuing a trial
tainted by a prejudicial judicial or prosecutorial error.
The important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retains primary control over the course to be followed in the event
31 7
of such error.
In effect, the Court held waiver analysis inappropriate because it
found no violation of the underlying constitutional right. The
Perez doctrine was seen as giving the defendant not the right to
an untainted first trial but solely the right to prevent the proceedings from being aborted without his or her consent once the
trial does become tainted by the actions of the prosecutor or the
judge.
The Court's analysis thus distinguishes between judicial
error that creates a possible need for mistrial and judicial error
in passing upon that need: error of the latter kind will insulate
the defendant from reprosecution, while error of the former
kind will not. Thus, in Dinitz, it was irrelevant whether the trial
judge failed to pursue alternative disciplinary action or other3-5 492 F.2d 53, 59 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 504 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc), rev'd, 96
S. Ct. 1075 (1976).
31 Mr. Justice Stevens did not participate and Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented.
317 96 S. Ct. at 1081 (footnote omitted).

19771

JEOPARDY AND MISTRIALS

wise erred in excluding defense counsel, because even if that action was improper, the judge did consider alternatives to mistrial
and did honor the defendant's preference in dealing with the
problem.
Although Dinitz might appear to limit the scope of a
defendant's protection from reprosecution, the decision does no
more than make explicit a limitation that always has been inherent in the Court's decisions safeguarding the "valued right to
have [a] trial completed by a particular tribunal. '3 18 If error
occurs in the course of a trial ending in conviction, the Court has
held ever since Ball that the defendant may be reprosecuted
upon reversal of the judgment.3 19 Accordingly, although a defendant does have a right to an untainted trial, this right is
ordinarily traceable to statutory or constitutional provisions
other than thi double jeopardy clause, and it has normally been
assumed that the only practicable remedy for its violation is a
new trial, not immunity from prosecution. The special interest
protected by the double jeopardy clause is the defendant's interest in pursuing the first trial to completion when this course
appears tactically advantageous, and this interest is protected
fully by honoring the defendant's preference for mistrial when a
difficulty arises. Indeed, as the Court recognized in Dinitz, an
approach barring retrial under these circumstances would require rejection of the defendant's mistrial motion and would
force completion of the trial, which would be followed presumably by conviction, 32 0 reversal based on the initial trial error, and
reprosecution as allowed by Ball. This process would impose
upon the defendant precisely the burden and expense against
which the double jeopardy clause is supposed to provide protection. Dinitz, therefore, correctly suggested that the double
jeopardy clause does not guarantee the right to a trial untainted
by the actions of the judge or the prosecutor; rather, the clause
protects only the defendant's right to participate in the decision
whether to abort the trial once taint occurs.
Although the concept of consent to mistrial therefore appears sound, the same cannot be said about the ways in which
lower courts have often applied it. The cases do recognize that
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
W
z United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); see text accompanying notes 28-30
supra.
3M0The defendant might, of course, be acquitted, but this is unlikely when the defense itself is pressing for mistrial.
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retrial should be barred when the defendant's mistrial motion is
triggered by prosecutorial misconduct that is intended to abort
the proceedings3 21 or is otherwise sufficiently egregious to require outright dismissal under due process standards,3 22 but this
limitation upon the consent doctrine is vague and has seldom
3 23
been applied with vigor by the courts.
Even more troubling has been the readiness of many courts
to engraft upon the consent doctrine notions of tacit consent or
constructive consent that expand the concept far beyond its justifiable limits. Courts have held that silence in the face of various
trial difficulties constitutes "consent" to mistrial, even when little
or no time was afforded for the defense to consider its options.32 4 Numerous cases also have found implicit consent to
mistrial simply because a defendant requested a long continuance,3 2 5 sought to retain a new attorney,32 6 or moved for a
judgment of acquittal.3 27 These decisions are wholly indefensible. In many of these situations, mistrial may not be the only
appropriate means to implement the defendant's motion, and
unless the defense has explicitly indicated a preference for the
mistrial remedy, it cannot be said that "the defendant retains
328 Mistrial
primary control over the course to be followed ...
may be proper, of course, regardless of the defendant's preference, but in that event it must be justified by double jeopardy
standards such as those discussed in this Article and not by
"consent."
321 Commonwealth v. Warfield, 424 Pa. 555, 227 A.2d 177 (1967); see United States
v. Dinitz, 96 S. Ct. 1075, 1081-82 (1976) (dictum); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470,
485 (1971) (dictum).
322 United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976); Crim v. State, 294
N.E.2d 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973).
323See, e.g., United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552 (3d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912 (1970); Commonwealth v. Wright, 439 Pa. 198, 266
A.2d 651 (1970).
324 United States v. Beckerman, 516 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1975) (alternate holding);
Holt v. State, 223 Ind. 217, 59 N.E.2d 563 (1945); Coppage v. State, 62 Okla. Crim.
325, 71 P.2d 509 (1937); see Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 782, 793-95 (1959 & Supp. 1976).
Decisions finding no consent under such circumstances, however, appear to be far more
common. E.g., Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 860 (1949); Curry v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 707, 470 P.2d 345, 87 Cal. Rptr.
361 (1970); People v. Gardner, 37 Mich. App. 520, 195 N.W.2d 62 (1972); see Annot.,
63 A.L.R.2d 782, 791-93 (1959 & Supp. 1976).
325 State v. Veres, 7 Ariz. App. 117, 436 P.2d 629 (1968) (alternate holding), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1014 (1969); People v. Ramirez, 27 Cal. App. 3d 660, 104 Cal. Rptr.
102 (1972); People v. Cabellero, 194 Misc. 145, 84 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1948).
326 People v. Smith, 13 Cal. App. 3d 897, 91 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1970).
327Selman v. State, 406 P.2d 181 (Alas. 1965); State v. Arnold, 142 Kan. 589, 50

P.2d 1008 (1935); State v. Allesi, 216 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1974).
328 United States v. Dinitz, 96 S. Ct. 1075, 1081 (1976).
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Similarly, an affirmative motion for mistrial by the defendant 32 9 does not end the need for a critical examination of the
underlying circumstances. Yet most courts fail to engage in such
an inquiry. For example, when a defense motion for mistrial
originally is denied, but mistrial is declared later in the trial, the
courts generally hold that the consent to mistrial continues, even
when intervening events may have made that course less favorable to the defendant.3 30 Some decisions go a step further and
hold that defense efforts to withdraw the mistrial motion are
ineffective and that the "consent" thus continues despite explicit
protestations to the contrary.3 3 1 In all of these situations, the
only course consonant with Dinitz is for the trial judge to take the
few moments necessary to inquire whether the defense maintains its mistrial motion, and then to honor whatever preference
the defense may express.
A defense motion for mistrial also should not constitute
"consent" when it results from a trial judge's refusal to consider
other solutions for the difficulties presented. In United States v.
Walden,3 3 2 two jurors had observed the defendants in handcuffs
during a recess and possibly inferred that they were in custody.
The judge rejected defense suggestions to probe the effect of the
incident upon the two jurors, to seat the two alternate jurors,
and to determine whether the other jurors had learned of the
incident. Finally, counsel for some of the defendants moved for
a mistrial. The denial of their double jeopardy pleas was upheld
by an equally divided Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc.
The court should have found these facts sufficient to establish that the mistrial motion was "involuntary" for double
jeopardy purposes. The "Hobson's choice" resulting from the
329 Courts usually hold that a mistrial motion by counsel is sufficient to establish
waiver or consent to mistrial by the defendant. See, e.g., People v. Strauss, 48 Misc. 2d
1006, 266 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1965); Commonwealth v. Wideman, 453 Pa. 119, 306 A.2d
894 (1973) (dictum); Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 782, 790-91 (1959 & Supp. 1976). Contra,
Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 341 A.2d 388 (1975). For a discussion of this issue, see
generally Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451-52 (1965); Comment, Criminal
Waiver: The Requirements of Personal Participation, Competence and Legitimate State Interest,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1262 (1966).
30 E.g., United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
873 (1973); Kamen v. Gray, 169 Kan. 664, 220 P.2d 160 (1950). Contra, United States ex
rel. Russo v. Superior Court, 483 F.2d 7 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973);
Fugett v. State, 271 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1972).
331 E.g., MacPherson v. State, 533 P.2d 1103 (Alas. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 871
(1975). Contra, Cardenas v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 273, 363 P.2d 889, 14 Cal. Rptr.
657 (1961); Gershon v. Sardonia, 50 Misc. 2d 423, 270 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1966);
Commonwealth v. Robson, 461 Pa. 615, 337 A.2d 573, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 934 (1975).
332 458 F.2d 36 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 867 (1972).
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initial contamination of the jury did not itself invalidate the ultimate mistrial motion. Because the judge, however, had refused
to consider reasonable alternatives to mistrial proposed by the
defendants, they did not retain "primary control over the course
to be followed . . . . 333 Thus, the judge's error infringed upon
the defendants' special interest in freely choosing whether to
complete the first trial. The same would have been true in Dinitz
if, after the judge's initial action excluding defense counsel, he
had refused to allow a continuance or an interlocutory appeal
and instead had left the defendant with no choice but to move
for mistrial. Under these circumstances, the defendant's underlying double jeopardy rights would have been directly violated and
no meaningful waiver could have been found.
In sum, the concept of consent is perfectly sound as long
as it is confined to situations in which the defendant enjoys an
unfettered choice whether to continue the proceedings and
clearly expresses a preference not to do so. Mistrial may of
course be proper in many other situations, but it must be justified by an evaluation of the competing considerations examined
in this Article, and not by any artificial notion of consent.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Illinois v. Somerville, the Supreme Court relaxed the limitations upon retrial after mistrial. The Court's opinion, however,
left unclear the status of earlier, more restrictive precedents and
provided few guidelines by which the propriety of mistrial can
be reliably determined at the time the decision must initially be
made. The lower courts, far from refining and clarifying the
applicable standards, have produced a mass of confusing and
contradictory decisions. This state of the law is unsatisfactory
because predictability is essential to provide defendants with
reasonably certain safeguards against the burden of repeated
trials and to prevent some defendants from winning unwarranted immunity from reprosecution.
An examination of the interests affected by mistrial decisions suggests that the result in Somerville was correct and that
the relatively permissive approach toward retrial implicit in that
decision should be followed in a wide range of situations. I have
endeavored to identify these situations and to specify the characteristics of a flexible standard of "sound judicial administration"
333United States v. Dinitz, 96 S. Ct. 1075, 1081 (1976).
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that is suitable for application in such situations both by trial
judges and by courts confronting double jeopardy claims subsequently. The standard of sound judicial administration does not,
however, provide adequate protection for double jeopardy interests in a number of discrete situations. I have thus sought to
identify these situations and to define the content of the more
restrictive "strict necessity" standard that is appropriate for determining the propriety of mistrial in these situations.
The standard of sound judicial administration can do much
to clarify and improve the administration of criminal justice
in mistrial cases. This relatively flexible approach, however,
should no longer be permitted to extend, as it often has since
Somerville, into those areas in which the stringent limitations of
earlier decisions remain an essential component of meaningful
double jeopardy protection.

